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ABSTRACT 
 
 Currently there are millions of people trapped within the 
confines of a failed state, where each day they are met with 
extreme risk in order to acquire the basic human needs. While 
these situations are easily classified as humanitarian emergencies, 
more often than not, the billions of dollars sent in aid harms the 
very communities they are charged to help. Through the case study 
of the world’s most failed state, Somalia, this thesis defines and 
deconstructs state failure, explains life on-the-ground in Somalia, 
while suggesting solutions for the future.  
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      AUGURIES OF INNOCENCE 
 
 
  “Every Night and Every Morn Some To Misery Are Born…1” 
   
    CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
“To See A World In A Grain of Sand…2” 
 
The Allegory 
 
 Imagine being trapped in an hourglass. The walls are clear, so outsiders can easily 
see you, but they would have to put a decent amount of effort in to communicate with 
you. Both parties are aware that at any minute waves of sand could envelope the glass, 
yet even though many storms are predictable, one can never really be sure when you will 
be smothered. At the same time, you have grown to fear almost everyone that lives inside 
the glass nearly as much, since those who are supposed to provide a safety net (teachers, 
doctors, police, etc.) have either already fled to a safer area, or are corrupt, and will 
instead choose to do harm unto you. Others walk throughout the enclosure, their clothing 
strapped with heavy weaponry; executions and mass atrocities are committed in public, 
and you never know where (and if) you will be able to get your next meal.   
 For the near two billion citizens trapped within the confines of “failed” or 
“failing” states3, this allegory not only defines their lives, but also dictates everyday risks 
that are near unimaginable for others. Millions have been displaced from their homes and 
separated from their families. They live in extreme poverty, forced to rely mainly on food 
                                                 
1 Blake, William. “Auguries of Innocence.” English Poetry II. 
<http://www.bartleby.com/41/356.html> (Lines 17-18). 
2 Blake, William. “Auguries of Innocence.” English Poetry II. 
<http://www.bartleby.com/41/356.html> (Line 1). 
3 Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace. “The Failed States Index 2005” and “Chart” Foreign Policy. 
149 (July/Aug 2005). <http://proxy.bc.edu/login?URL=http://search.ebscohost.com 
/proxy.bc.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&an=17337154&site=BSI-LIVE> 
 5 
rations from humanitarian aid groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the 
presence of which is declining on a weekly basis. All of this while the international 
community chooses to ignore documented human rights abuses, in pursuit of endeavors 
in countries that are less poor, or at least have an abundance of natural resources. The 
simple reality of this story is that most failed states are not within the “vital interests” of 
the major global players, thus patterns of brutality remain cyclical and ever-present until 
it someday implodes. Just shy of even recognizing the wound- the international 
community is loath to even attempt to offer a band-aid.  
 
“A Robin Redbreast In A Cage Puts All Heaven In A Rage…4” 
 
Failed States as an Obligation to the International Community 
 After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the United States and other major  
International players were pushed to rethink security theories that revolved entirely 
around similar “superpowers” and like doctrines that had been in place since the Cold 
War era. It was in this light, later in 2002, that the U.S. National Security Strategy held 
the following overview on its first page: 
   That great struggle is over. The militant visions of class, nation,  
   and race which promised utopia and delivered misery have been  
   defeated and discredited. America is now threatened less by  
   conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less 
   by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands  
   of the embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our Nation,  
   allies, and friends.5 
 
With great haste war was initiated on a concept- global terrorism- and failed states, by 
association, became the contemporary iron curtain. The aforementioned statement 
                                                 
4 Blake, William. “Auguries of Innocence.” English Poetry II. 
<http://www.bartleby.com/41/356.html> (Lines 5-6). 
5 US National Security Strategy. 2002. < http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library 
/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf> (01). 
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proffers commitment to the dismantling of such places, as failed states are deemed 
inherent safe havens for terrorists, and the greatest threat to the United States of America. 
 Yet that is hardly the reality of the last nine years. While it remains true that the 
media often portrays failing states, especially in the Middle East and North/East Africa 
regions, to be terrorist enclaves, the U.S. (as well as the International community for that 
matter) still have not even come to an agreement on the conditions that classify a state as 
“failing” or “failed.” While many political scientists, humanitarians and NGO workers 
have produced models of their own, no two are alike, and many include upwards of 
twenty variables, none of which seem to have to be present in all cases in order for the 
definition to fit. Variations of synonyms ranging from “weak” to “collapsed,” are given 
to any geographic expression with faulty governments or institutions; massive indexes 
have been tabulated and ranked, some of which include the United States itself as a 
failing state. 
 If truthfully it is the U.S. National Security Strategy to implement change in failed 
states, one should first have to develop a working definition of what a hypothetical failed 
state would entail. Thus, this study will attempt to do so, both by presenting indicators in 
a research design, but also by applying it to the country that is considered by many to be 
the “most failed state” in both 2008 and 2009, and recently called “the most dangerous 
place in the world” by Foreign Policy6- Somalia. In order to understand the concept to its 
fullest extent, indicators will be expanded through the case study in terms of causes and 
effects on Somalia through the lens of a failed state. Who is creating these problems, and 
should they be fixed? Where does the true source of state failure reside? Are the security 
                                                 
6 Gettleman, Jeffrey. “The Most Dangerous Place in the World.” Foreign Policy Online (Mar/Apr 
2009). < http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4682> (01). 
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issues that trouble the United States and others really a mere symptom created by a void 
in the form of humanitarian assistance that is the most difficult to acquire- political will?  
 
“Poison Gets From Slander’s Tongue…7” 
Consequences of the Inability to Define Failed States 
 Many argue that state composition and subsequent collapse are unique to the 
polity in question. However if variables can be identified, perhaps more can be done to 
attempt to ‘rescue’ states before collapse becomes inevitable. As a recent report 
conducted by the World Bank suggests that, “within five years, half of all countries 
emerging from civil unrest [will] fall back into conflict in a cycle of collapse,8” it is clear 
that some pattern of mismanagement must exist, in that it will continue to falter in the 
near future. Unfortunately, maintaining the boundaries and institutions of a stable state is 
not only difficult but also costly, while maintaining basic governmental functions and 
human liberties prove to be an oft-forfeited challenge for many states throughout the 
world. Instead, private non-state actors arise in the vacuum that has been left by collapsed 
government institutions, where their newfound powers find favorable conditions to 
spread and grow. More of this will be discussed in the third chapter. Statistical data 
suggests that should violent conflicts continue within weak states, significant increases in 
illegal arms proliferation, health epidemics (such as HIV/AIDs), “brain drain,” and 
                                                 
7 Blake, William. “Auguries of Innocence.” English Poetry II. 
<http://www.bartleby.com/41/356.html> (Line 46). 
8 Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace. “The Failed States Index 2005” and “Chart” Foreign Policy. 
149 (July/Aug 2005). <http://proxy.bc.edu/login?URL=http://search.ebscohost.com 
/proxy.bc.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&an=17337154&site=BSI-LIVE> 
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grand-scale refugee flow are inevitable9; each of which prove debilitating to a faltering 
state in their own right.  
 Add to this the current belief in the field that failed states have a tendency to 
become clustered together; territorial boundaries become porous due to massive refugee 
fluctuation, and elements of breakdown bind the two countries at their territorial 
periphery10. Without effective means to exert authority or force at shared boundary 
points, both states are put in danger of collapse. This tends to be especially true with 
African countries; of which they constitute eleven of the top twenty most failed states in 
nearly each of the “Failed States Indexes,” published by Foreign Policy and Fund for 
Peace since 200511. No longer a mere humanitarian predicament of the 1990s, when 
African governments are unable to provide safety, basic health needs and public services 
to their people, order becomes utterly scant in already destitute nations tinkering on the 
edge of disintegration. 
 Many of these same authors assume this trend of state collapse in Africa to be 
directly linked to the endemic poverty and economic decline in the area. However, the 
research in this study finds that failing states will rarely benefit from successes in the 
economy, while they will be harmed when the economy falters. For instance, surpluses in 
the economy in 2005 resulted in billions of dollars being forgiven from developing-
                                                 
9 Klopp, Jacqueline and Prisca Kamungi. “Violence and Elections: Will Kenya Collapse?” World 
Policy Journal. (Winter 2007/2008). (16). 
10 Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace. “The Failed States Index 2007” and “Chart of Political 
Instability” Foreign Policy. 161 (July/Aug 2007). (05). 
11 Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace. “The Failed States Index 2006” and “Chart” Foreign 
Policy. 155 (Jul/Aug 2006). < http://proxy.bc.edu/login?url=http://search. 
ebscohost.com.proxy.bc.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=20878838&site=bsi-live> 
(54). 
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country debts, yet still these countries showed little if any signs of improvement12. With 
the global economy at all-time recession lows, chances of receiving aid packages of that 
caliber are hard to come by, and realistically not quite possible. Instead, the U.S. and the 
U.N. are left with the difficulty of choosing some over others13- an exceptional dilemma 
when there are so many states that depend on foreign assistance in order to survive. When 
placed in this hypothetical triage, African countries usually do not fare well. Not only is it 
common for only a small percentage of aid to reach refugees, due to widespread 
corruption amongst political leadership, there are often many other countries that suggest 
a higher promise of change for a lesser investment. Without major strides made in 
standard indicators, such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
and similar reports by groups such as Freedom House and World Report, the African 
countries will continue to remain part of the injured in the ‘triage,’ but stuck with those 
whose treatment will be delayed. Furthermore, the case study will prove that receipt of 
foreign aid in money or arms do very little to change the situation on the ground for the 
better. Thus the millions of dollars doled out for humanitarian assistance harm the very 
areas they intend to help. 
“Somalia embodies one of post-colonial Africa’s worst mismatches between  
conventional state structures and indigenous customs and institutions.14” 
Defining Failed States 
                                                 
12 Ibid. (51). 
13 Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace “The Failed States Index 2009” and “Chart” Foreign Policy. 
173 (Jul/Aug 2009) <http://proxy.bc.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost. 
com.proxy.bc.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=43448820&site=bsi-live> (82).  
14 Kaplan, Seth. “Rethinking State-building in a Failed State.” The Washington Quarterly. 33.1 
(Jan 2010). (82). 
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 While state collapse may happen suddenly, especially in the case of a debilitating 
natural disaster or military coup d’etat, it is often a slow process of deterioration within 
the structural elements of the government apparatus. When the institutions of the state 
begin to wither, citizens look to those in power who can neither answer for the 
predicament (or perhaps were involved), nor provide a strategy for change. Many 
political scientists blame the widespread inaptitude of African leaders and the remaining 
stigma attached with post-colonial nations on the hasty exit of colonizers at the time of 
independence, and the lack of competent native leaders left in their wake. Also, the 
transition towards independence often requires the attempt to forge a national identity out 
of groups that, under colonial rule, did not share the same ethnicity, politics, and/or 
religion. There are also extreme cases, such as in Somalia, where the Italian colonized the 
South and the British colonized the North, so that attempts to forge a national identity of 
a “Greater Somalia” misses entirely that the two did not even share the same language! 
Thus the state is artificial, one that perhaps would have never been produced by a society 
that had not demanded its constructs15. 
 When colonizers had to forgo power, they often left with great haste, leaving little 
instruction for the means by which the native people would govern themselves. The 
resulting end products were hollow institutions, which were warped further by power-
hungry natives who desired ultimate control over the new government and were able to 
exploit the weaknesses of nascent institutions. Political scientists Gerald B. Helman and 
Steven R. Ratner rightfully point out that “self-determination was given more importance 
                                                 
15 Luling, Virginia. “Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State.” Third World 
Quarterly. 18.2 (June 1997). (286). 
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than long-term survivability in the maintenance of their own sovereignty.16” History has 
proven countless times over that external orchestration of state building and alterations in 
the political processes rarely bring about the desired results for either party involved, and 
even in the rare case that it does succeed, it is most often never within the anticipated 
time period17. Thus states never possess full legitimacy right from the start, and natives 
see the new government apparatus as corrupt, illegal and ineffective. The people shift 
their allegiances to external non-state actors to perform the core functions of the state, 
and gradually spikes in levels of instability cause fractures to the state until it collapses. 
Add to this widespread violence, which often occurs in areas where the police and 
military are ineffective, and the actors of the state no longer control the apparatus or what 
is inside of it18. As suggested by Professor J. Peter Pham, these states are not surviving 
because they consist of working governments that provide “internal legitimacy.19” 
Instead, this case study will argue that such African states have survived because of 
international recognition that is foolishly placed upon faulty leaders when the 
international community lacks the political will to change the status quo. 
 
“Some Are Born To Sweet Delight, Some Are Born To Endless Night…20” 
Three Spheres of State Breakdown 
                                                 
16 Helman, Gerald B. and Steven R. Ratner. “Saving Failed States” Foreign Policy. 89 (Winter 
1992/1993). (03-04).  
17 Hagmann, Tobias and Markus V. Hoehne. “Failures of the State Failure Debate: Evidence from 
the Somali Territories” Journal of International Development. 21.1. (22). 
18 Ferguson, Brian R. “Tribal Warfare and ‘Ethnic’ Conflict” Cultural Survival Quarterly. 29.1 
(Spring 2005). (18). 
19 Pham, Peter J. “Do Not Resuscitate.” The National Interest. 94 (Apr. 2004). (21). 
20 Blake, William. “Auguries of Innocence.” English Poetry II. 
<http://www.bartleby.com/41/356.html> (Lines 121-122). 
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 While it is true that states that are currently considered “failing” or “failed” may 
not share all of the same characteristics, they all demonstrate a critical lack of control, 
brought on by the failure to maintain the state’s monopoly of coercive power, the 
determining factor of state legitimacy as laid out by sociologist Max Weber. Since the 
state must be considered the only source that may rightfully use violence, both internally 
and externally, the existence of outside actors wielding violence within the state 
immediately calls the legitimacy of the state apparatus into question. Once legitimacy and 
the monopoly on the use of violent force are challenged, the state and all of its 
institutions are jolted and begin to decompose in three spheres of influence: socio-
demographically, economically, and politically. Though not all of these variables need to 
be present within each of the three indicators, the state may still be deemed “failing” as 
most of the variables are interconnected, and the missing variables will most likely come 
to fruition in the near future. The state eventually deconstructs to Hobbes’ original state 
of nature, “the war of all against all.21” 
 Socio-demographic factors often occur organically, outside of the control of state 
actors. They consist of an inability to travel or leave the area for the purpose of 
relocation; proximity to environmental hazards; an “age bulge” in youth and/or elderly 
populations; formation, migration and growth of exile communities; and major 
opposition groups’ ideology against the nation and government institutions. Ability to 
travel may seem to be a minor point, but it highlights the fluctuation of “brain drain,” or 
the mass migration of skilled professionals to more favorable, safer, geographic locations. 
Those who cannot emigrate are usually the members of the lower class, who do not have 
                                                 
21 Thurer, Daniel. “An Internal Challenge: Partnerships In Fixing Failed States.” Harvard 
International Review. 29.4 (Winter 2008). (43). 
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the financial capability to do so. Thus, an unskilled lower class, a declining middle class, 
and a near non-existent upper class overwhelm the state with little opportunity for change 
within the class representations. The impoverished that remain still attempt to flee from 
violence, resulting in massive refugee movement throughout the country, and often into 
neighboring countries. These exile communities overwhelm the new areas often 
prompting them to collapse as well, suggesting that border-states may also be driven to 
state collapse. 
 Furthermore, an age bulge usually exists in the remaining population, where 
significant proportions are young, elderly, or both. Since these groups are unable to 
contribute much to the economy or skilled labor class, they tend to reap more from the 
government apparatus than they are able to put into it. These two groups need to be 
buffered by middle-aged generations, who put more work into the apparatus in order to 
support the other groups, with the expectation that the same has been, and will be 
provided to them in the future. With an age bulge of 40-50% (which statistically 
represents current-day Somalia), it is impossible to provide for all of these individuals, 
yet they will try to reap benefits from the state that it can no longer provide. Basic 
resources in the state falter, and environmental hazards skyrocket from the sheer amount 
of refugees in constant movement. 
 Finally, the ideology of majority opposition parties, such as clan-groups and 
warlords, serve as direct opposition to the legitimacy of the state. Once confidence is lost 
in appointed leaders, it is relatively easy for alternative non-state actors to wield their 
ideology to sway people towards their following. Especially if the people feel they have 
been oppressed or put in danger by government officials, most notably the police and 
 14 
military, faith in security essentially vanishes. This is also true of NGOs, and similar aid 
workers, where political decisions made on their behalf often dictate the repercussions 
that will result from the spread of non-state actors’ negative ideologies. As the people no 
longer feel they can trust the government to protect them, the familial bond of clan and 
small group opposition fills the void. Often one or more clan or opposition groups may 
attempt to overthrow the skeletal remains of the government by a militant coup, or 
demand kickbacks in return for some form of protection rackets.  
 The economic factors present in failed states also explain the loss of trust and 
security for government institutions. They include a blatant neglect for financial 
obligations; the growth of a “hidden economy;” and a reliance upon foreign and 
humanitarian aid that is unequally and improperly distributed. The basic economic 
functions of the state are two-fold. They encompass the financial obligations the state has 
to the economy, as well as the obligations it has to its citizens in terms of providing goods 
and services. Financial obligations to the state are easily found and measured- a 
progressive decline in GDP, massive debts and business failures, inability to import or 
export goods, drops in commodity prices and foreign investments, inability to collect 
taxes, and the debasement or inflation of national currency. The government can no 
longer afford to pay for goods and services; often they can barely afford to provide 
salaries for the military and other public officials. The “hidden economy,” the black 
market, arms and drug trade, and other illegal commodities, become the only resource for 
cycling monetary wealth in and out of the country. Lack of employment and a faltering 
economy significantly reduces the people’s trust in government officials and institutions. 
 15 
 Lastly, political factors, heavily influenced by the socio-demographic and 
economic factors, take the state from being a security problem to the level of state failure. 
These factors include a complete loss of the monopoly of violence and coercion; 
corruption and disintegration of political institutions; deterioration of public goods and 
services; and suspended rule of law with massive human rights violations. These 
atrocities quickly gain widespread attention from locals, and often by media outlets, yet 
the offenders are rarely punished- justice is a highly sought commodity in collapsed 
states. At the same time, the vacancy of goods and services provides alternate actors their 
route to power since they, in essence, take on the core functions of the state. Albeit 
through corrupt means, the people begin to trust non-state actors, as they are the only 
outlets that provide security. Since it is relatively easy and inexpensive to obtain arms, 
mostly through the expansion of the black market, non-state actors are also able to 
achieve high levels of disruption, while acquiring a large following domestically and in 
the Diaspora communities. 
 
“Since 1991, Somalia has not been a state so much as a lawless, ungoverned space on 
the map between its neighbors and the sea.22” 
The Case Study: Somalia Is A Failed State 
 According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Somalia 
is the world’s most corrupt state23, a title that it has successfully held for the past four 
years. It similarly tops Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace’s “Failed States Index,” where 
it has held the top position for the past two years, and a spot in the top five since the 
                                                 
22 Gettleman, Jeffrey. “Axis of Upheaval: Somalia: The Most Dangerous Place in the World.” 
Foreign Policy. 171 (Mar.-Apr. 2009). (64). 
23 Transparency International. “2008 Corruptions Perceptions Index” 
<http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009> 
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corruption index began in 2005. Since the fall of the Siad Barre Regime in 1991, by a 
collection of opposing clan groups that similarly dismantled soon thereafter, the country 
has been unable to maintain a working government, despite fifteen attempts to install 
transitional governments by the international community. Individual clans crave control 
of what is left of skeletal government institutions, and each uses violence towards the 
other in an attempt to monopolize coercion where the state has been unable to do so. 
Consequently, Somalia is also well known internationally for being the country whose 
failed humanitarian intervention made the U.S. and U.N. change their views on the nature 
of such operations, when footage of dead U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets 
of the capitol city of Mogadishu made its way into foreign press, most commonly known 
by its Hollywood book/movie version ‘Black Hawk Down’. While foreign aid workers 
still flee from the constant violence on the streets, an estimated 3.5 million Somalis suffer 
from the effects of war and famine24, making the situation both a humanitarian nightmare 
and utter emergency. With its socio-demographic, economic and political spheres in 
shambles, it is hard to deny that Somalia is a failed state. 
 Socio-demographically, Somalia paints a sad picture of a country torn by extreme 
poverty and destitution. On top of being forced to live amongst daily violence in the 
streets, the average Somali lives in abject poverty. While most are without jobs, those 
who are able to find employment live on earnings of less than $1 (U.S.) per day25. Most 
are uneducated past the early years, over half are illiterate, and the government 
expenditure towards education is still less than $2 per person26. Life expectancy is about 
                                                 
24 Hogg, Annabel Lee. “Timeline: Somalia, 1991-2008.” The Atlantic Monthly. (Dec. 2008). (03). 
25 Nevin, Tom. “A Failed State That Functions” African Business. 333 (July 2007). (55). 
26 de Waal, Alex. “The Shadow Economy” Africa Report. 38.2 (Mar/Apr 2003). (25). 
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forty-one years old27 and only twenty-one percent of people have access to drinkable 
water28. While free food aid is shipped into the country from various humanitarian groups 
and NGOs, corrupt agents in the government often hoard the majority of it for themselves 
and members of their clans, if pirates have not already pilfered the shipments. A report by 
the U.S. General Accounting Office estimated that since the late 1980’s, under twenty 
percent of food aid was actually consumed by Somali refugees29. Still, in the areas where 
food aid has been able to reach the people, it has managed to cause more harm than good, 
since often it is shipped to the same areas where Somali farmers try to sell their harvests. 
As the food aid is free, the farmers are unable to do business, the food spoils, and the area 
quickly spirals into famine-like conditions. Despite these destitute circumstances, 
Somalia is still experiencing population growth at a high of 2.82%. With exceptional 
population growth comes an age bulge, which accounts for 44.7% of the population being 
under the average age of fifteen years old30.  
 Moreover, the situation is only getting worse. In the first seven months of 2008, 
the number of people that required emergency assistance increased an estimated 77%31. 
While a number of factors contributed to this surge, a great majority is due to increased 
incidents of violence. While hundreds of thousands flee their homes to escape street 
warfare, the local hospitals have neither the manpower nor the financial capability to care 
                                                 
27 Ibid. (25). 
28 Nevin, Tom. “A Failed State That Functions” African Business. 333 (July 2007). (55). 
29 de Waal, Alex. “The Shadow Economy” Africa Report. 38.2 (Mar/Apr 2003) (26). 
30 Fund for Peace. Country Profile “Somalia” <http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=380&Itemid=537> These numbers are from 
statistics collected in 2008. 
31 The increase represents an estimated 1.8 million people in January 2008 that were in need of 
emergency assistance, to roughly 3.2 million in July of the same year.  
Idle, Mohamed. “Somalia: The Humanitarian Tremor Midfielders.” Hiiraan Online. 22 Jan. 2009. 
(01). <http://www.hiiraan.com/op2/2010/jan/Somalia_the_humanitarian 
_tremor_midfielders.aspx> 
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for the injured. Even in refugee camps, the mortality rate amongst both children and 
adults is “more than twice the emergency threshold,” where over fifty percent of deaths 
were due to treatable or avoidable illnesses, like Diarrhea, caused by extremely 
unsanitary conditions in the camps32. Even with the presence of numerous U.N. and NGO 
organizations, former Puntland presidential candidate Nuradin Dirie describes his country 
as one in which nearly four million people still go without food on a daily basis33. 
 Even with sizeable refugee flows domestically and to nearby Ethiopia and Kenya, 
the private, “hidden” economy continues to prosper, mostly because of a system known 
as hawala, common to Muslim countries in the area. Hawala is a trust-based money 
transfer system, where Somalis throughout the world are able to send funds back to their 
clans by making deposits with a dealer in a foreign land for a small fee. The dealer has a 
connection within each clan back in Somalia, where in a matter of days the funds may be 
‘withdrawn’ from the Somali dealer’s personal funds and given to the individual for 
which it was intended. Since banks do not exist in Somalia, physical money is never 
actually moved; the dealer in Somalia gives the clans his own money, while the money 
that was ‘sent’ remains in a foreign account in order to accrue interest for both dealers. 
This system of exchange and brokerage is the only institution that natives feel they can 
trust, as it has functioned since the 1970s when Siad Barre legalized the black market. In 
its first ten years in existence, credit from government sources disappeared altogether, 
                                                 
32 De Torrente, Nicolas and Fabrice Weissman. “A War Without Limits: Somalia’s Humanitarian 
Catastrophe” Harvard International Review 30.4 (Winter 2009). (15). 
33 Dirie, Nuradin. “Somalia and the Cost of State Failure: Speech Given at the Centre for African 
Studies at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark” Hiiraan Online. (Jan. 2010) (01). 
<http://www.hiiraan.com/op2/2010/jan/Somalia_and_the_cost_of_state_ failure.aspx>  
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while ninety-three percent of capital investment was funded through this privatized 
system34.  
 While the system of hawala is still thriving as the most popular means of trade 
and financing, the U.S. government has been attempting to shut it down, as they suspect 
hawala to be a means for financing terrorism. Despite these attempts, it is estimated that 
last year alone over $1 billion moved into Somalia in this manner35, with the average 
transfer generally constituting less than $100. Some of the hawala companies also 
support local businesses by providing credit and small loans, while similarly assisting 
international bodies with payments for imports and exports36. The hawala system has 
become a necessity for economic transactions, as many shopkeepers and merchants no 
longer accept the Somali shilling as valid currency. In 2001, clan leaders had new 
shillings printed in Canada and Malaysia, which led to enormous debasement and 
hyperinflation37. Without a legal and functioning economy, Somalis rank highly amongst 
the poorest in the world, while transitional governments are faced with a mounting debt 
of $3.2 billion (U.S.) owed to the international community38. 
 Just as a formal economy has been unable to prosper, so too have the 
governmental systems set up by foreigners, which have failed to form any real and 
trustworthy institutions, despite fifteen attempts to do so. This includes the current puppet 
                                                 
34 Medani, Khalid M. “Financing Terror or Survival?: Informal Finance and State Collapse in 
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government, the Transitional Federal Unity Government (TFUG), which was put in 
power by the U.N. in 2009, as the U.N. determined the people and then-government (the 
Transitional Federal Government or TFG) unfit for self-rule. In an article written by 
journalist and former Governor of the Central Bank of Somalia, Mohamud M. Uluso, he 
alleges that the TFUG, despite U.N. reports that claim quite the contrary, only controls a 
few square blocks of the capitol city of Mogadishu39. Likewise, the TFUG has been 
unable to extend control to Puntland, where piracy runs rampant along the coastline. 
Infighting between clan-factions rages out of control, with an estimated 17,000 civilians 
caught in the crossfire of violent insurgencies in the past two years alone40. Streets 
remain littered with bullet casings and most buildings remain bombed-out orifices of 
what once was. In a sad irony, many people are grateful that the TFUG host such little 
influence, as the previous two major governments, which held slightly more control, (the 
Barre regime and the TFG) conducted violence against its own people, all of which went 
unpunished.  
 While there are many instances of violence, the first case to garner international 
attention were the acts that were undertaken by the National Security Service under the 
regime of Siad Barre. This so-called intelligence agency, also called the “Somali 
Gestapo” by locals, was comprised of members of Barre’s clan (as well as the clans of his 
mother and brother-in-law). These secret police detained citizens without trial and then 
tortured them to suppress dissidents and opposition groups demanding civil liberties41. 
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Further atrocities committed under the Barre regime will be discussed later in the case 
study. After the defeat of Barre’s regime, clan leaders did little to reverse the declining 
situation. Instead, they used food and relief supplies as weapons in the factional civil war 
that ensued. While the majority of the population was driven to starvation despite the 
influx of food and humanitarian aid, it became clear that the people were suffering at the 
hands of armed clan leaders who had discovered deprivation to be an advantageous 
tool42. 
 The regime that came to power in the wake of this clan-cronyism, the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG), proved to be little different in initiating violence against its 
own people. A report by Amnesty International in 2008 charged the TFG as, “more 
aggressive than any other parties to the conflict, including the Islamists [fundamentalist 
groups] and [the] Ethiopian military.43” TFG forces allegedly rampaged houses and farms 
to loot them of what little they had left, raped women and children, and killed citizens 
and left their bodies en masse in unmarked gravesites. During major rainstorms human 
remains are washed throughout the streets44, a vivid image of tragedy without any form 
of justice. Actors in the TFG and in the Barre regime have gone unpunished, despite 
reports from major humanitarian organizations, which have documented countless human 
rights abuses. Today, the situation is plummeting to anarchic and uncontrollable levels, 
presenting “all the elements for [another] full-blown famine- war, displacement, drought, 
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skyrocketing food prices, and an exodus of aid workers.45” For all of the reasons above, 
as well as countless other cases, Somalia is undoubtedly a failed state. Is it possible that 
despite twenty years of international involvement, Somalia is no better off, if not worse, 
than it was at the start? Since many blame the country’s faults itself, it is necessary to 
understand this period in its proper historical context. 
 
“The state was both the arena within which they fought and the prize for which they 
contended.46” 
Somalia: Responsible For Its Own Failure? 
 While many historians claim that Somalia, since independence, has never 
maintained a legitimate government, the events that transpired in the first quarter-century 
under the leadership of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre animate the comprehensive 
decomposition of society. In order to remain in power, Barre finessed a nationalistic 
public image that supposedly weeded out the colonial clan systems. In reality, the 
opposite was true- bureaucratic positions were quickly occupied by his family’s clans, “a 
practice that earned his government the code-name M.O.D.- an acronym of the 
Mareehaan, Ogaden and Dulbahante clans.47” Outsider clans were pitted against one 
another, while the patronage system kept opposition leaders in the grasp of the 
government. Claiming to rule under the guise of scientific socialism Barre sought 
assistance from the former Soviet Union, and when that relationship crumbled he turned 
to its arch-enemy, the United States. Support from the U.S. soon accounted for an 
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estimated fifty-seven percent of annual Gross National Product (GNP)48, with military 
and economic aid totaling over $700 million (U.S.)49. It was not until the Cold War had 
ended, and both superpowers had left, that local dissidents were able to successfully tear 
at the seams of the apparatus Barre had constructed50. 
 In response to opposition groups in the Northern regions, Barre and his cronies 
carried out unprecedented violent attacks against entire clans as group punishment. 
Becoming exceedingly uneasy, Barre attempted to destroy revolutionary sentiment by 
making things like gossip a capital crime51. Authorizing the military to use whatever 
means necessary, massive firepower campaigns decimated entire civilian populations 
where alleged guerrillas resided. The devastation continued for months as water sources 
were poisoned, farms were looted or burned, and thousands of “prominent individuals” 
thought to be sympathetic to the brewing revolution were imprisoned52. Bashe Abdi 
Yousuf, a member of the Isaaq clan and survivor of the atrocities who is now attempting 
to sue members of the Barre regime living in the U.S., claims that in prison he, “was 
tortured – waterboarded and put in electric shock.53” Finally, a militant group calling 
itself the United Somali Congress (USC) drove Barre out of Mogadishu in January 1991, 
where he died from natural causes in exile four years later. His absence immediately 
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caused fissures in USC leadership, resulting in multiple parties declaring themselves to 
be the legitimate government. 
 Without a true leader in place to maintain a nationalist agenda, people quickly 
inverted back to the past- their clan groups- since prior to colonization the household and 
community elders owned and controlled all land and livestock54. Unfortunately, the ease 
of acquiring weapons and extreme desires for power and fame turned modern clan 
leaders into warlords. With no institution to mediate between warlords jousting for 
control, an all-out civil war exploded into every village. Using weapons left over on the 
black market from the U.S. and the Soviets, warlords imposed force to claim rights over 
anything they could get their hands on; setting up checkpoints and roadblocks, claiming 
airstrips and port areas, even demanding ownership over the telephone poles55. Many of 
these factions tried to proclaim their illegal dealings as legitimate actions of the state- 
some even imposed taxes on their enterprises56! Still, no clan group was able to maintain 
a true monopoly of violence, further catapulting the state into cyclical violence and 
collapse.  
 That is, until some religious Islamic leaders decided to demand change. By the 
mid-2000’s, these leaders in the capitol city of Mogadishu set up a loose network of local 
courts to punish those who had committed crimes such as rape and murder. Islamic law, 
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or shari’a, considered “the one set of principles that different clans could agree on,57” 
governed the trials. Calling themselves the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), they set out to 
disarm local warlords, seeing it as the only way to instill peace. They also outlawed 
chewing the popular stimulant qaat (khat), and held militants accountable by the rule of 
corporal punishment. Seeing their local efforts met with success, as for the first time it 
was safe to walk the streets of Mogadishu at night, the ICU extended their reach to crack 
down on piracy, a rising problem that took advantage of the thousands of ships that 
passed through the Gulf of Aden annually. Using their connections to clans, they first 
began to negotiate with the coastal towns to make sure that they would not support or 
harbor pirates. When the ICU caught wind of an attack in progress, they stormed the ship 
themselves and arrested the hijackers. According to the International Maritime Bureau 
(IMB), during the height of ICU power in 2006, there was the lowest number of pirate 
attacks off the Somali coast in this decade58. Locals did not care that the ICU ruled with 
shari’a as its leading tenet; what they did care about was that for the first time in fifteen 
years there was peace instead of anarchy. 
 The population at large was more than ready for peace, and the ICU’s influence 
quickly spread to the Southern areas of Somalia. Establishing a separate police force, 
they extended control from adjudicating incidents to halting crime before it occurred. In 
order to establish relationships with clans further south, the ICU co-opted peaceful clan 
leaders into high positions in local administrations59. All of this was accomplished 
without a nationalistic agenda, as the ICU was well aware of peoples’ desire to maintain a 
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decentralized government with the clan system at its core. The ICU provided this and 
more, as one ICU militia trainer described the reason for the groups successes: “The 
warlords, they did not know how to fight. They had the guns and the money and the khat, 
but they did not have the heart. For many months we have not been paid to fight, whether 
in money or in khat. We fight with our hearts.60” Not only were ICU members not paid to 
fight, they provided security to businesses and locals without charging or taxing them. 
Out of support, and gratitude, clans began buying them weapons to ensure the 
continuance of the newly instilled order61. 
 Though the ICU had successfully spread a lasting peace throughout the country, 
its rule was met with major hostility from the U.S. and the international community. 
Believing the ICU to have a radical Islamic state-building agenda, the United States 
insisted the group was connected to known terrorist factions in the Middle East, and to its 
main enemy al Qaeda. In response, U.S. and NATO allies shut off air and sea travel, and 
asked neighboring countries to close their borders. According to Ali Osman, a Somali 
writer living in Mogadishu, this operation resulted in the deaths of 10,000 Somalis and 
the displacement of 1.5 million others62. To institute further control over the area, the 
U.N. convened a council in Kenya to create a new transitional government, while the 
U.S. backed the Ethiopian government’s desire to invade Somalia through the shared 
northern Ogaden region. When the TFG was introduced in Mogadishu, it garnered little 
public support. It was evident to the ICU and the public alike that the international 
community sought to replace the current peace with a government chosen by outsiders 
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that consisted of known violent warlords that the ICU had fought desperately to drive 
from power63. To make public opinion matters worse, the TFG openly supported the 
Ethiopian invasion; many considered this tantamount to treason, as Ethiopia and Somalia 
have been fighting major battles against each other since the mid-1500’s. Having to fight 
against warlords, a new internationally backed transitional government and the powerful 
Ethiopian military proved exceedingly difficult to ICU forces, and intense warfare broke 
out on the streets, with thousands of civilians caught in the midst of the fighting. 
 In order to quell the escalating violence and return to the ICU’s original agenda of 
decentralized state building, in July of 2006 they declared a holy war against Ethiopia. As 
the presence of the Ethiopian military could be considered a foreign invasion, leaders in 
the ICU ranks easily established their justification for jihad, and spread their ideology 
accordingly. Speaking on behalf of the ICU, military leader Ahmed proclaimed, “We will 
view them as invading troops, and we are ready to defend ourselves because we are not 
ready to be colonized again by any sort of troops in the world.64” Despite consistent 
counter-insurgency attacks from the TFG and U.N.-backed African corps, the much 
weaker ICU forces planned an attack outside Baidoa, about 100 miles northwest of the 
capitol. To mitigate their military deficiency, the ICU earned the support of an Eritrean 
contingent, as they also had a long history of fighting against Ethiopia. ICU forces, with 
the help of an estimated two thousand Eritrean troops, attacked Baidoa in early 
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December. On Christmas Eve that same year65, Ethiopian troops demolished the area, 
pushing the ICU back towards the capitol, where they disbanded or went underground66. 
 Thus, the American-backed Ethiopian military managed to quash the only faction 
that had brought peace to Somalia in fifteen years. Since the TFG openly supported the 
invasion, they never managed to garner much of a following from the Somali people, and 
remained sequestered in Villa Somalia67 guarded by U.N. forces from Burundi. In the 
power vacuum left in the wake of the ICU, warlords found their way back to their former 
clan communities and again imposed harsh command and taxes in the constant struggle 
for their own legitimate supremacy. The warlords did little to improve conditions; a 
harrowing account of notorious warlord (and Mayor of Mogadishu until Fall 2008) 
Mohamed Dheere illustrates the situation on the ground: 
   As Mayor, his first two priorities were “security and taxes.”  
   Security meant his private militia of red-eyed boys who robbed  
   people at checkpoints. Taxes meant that he was actually about to  
   start making the few people left in Mogadishu (those too old or  
   poor to flee from town) pay for the right to live in a war zone.68 
 
Any notion of a central government, even one that connected small, decentralized clans 
to a larger network, immediately disappeared. Anarchy and lawlessness again took over, 
and individual greed became the arbiter of the day.  
 
“He Who Doubts From What He Sees Will Ne’er Believe, Do What You Please…69” 
Who Is To Blame and Where To Go From Here? 
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 Delving through the historical events in Somalia in the past twenty years proves 
that Somalis themselves are not entirely to blame for the collapse of their country. In fact, 
they successfully created and supported a grass-roots government in the form of the ICU, 
heralded despite its overtly religious doctrines. Homegrown political efforts were 
dismantled by international counter-efforts and replaced with another transitional 
apparatus without Somali support or participation. In an attempt to discover where the 
cause of state failure is, the next chapter will present the international responses to crisis 
in the area, on the behalf of the United States as well as the United Nations. The third 
chapter will begin with a special focus on the latest transitional governments, the TFG 
and TFUG, then it will examine the non-state actors that assume power in the wake of 
government institutions- and especially their need for that vacuum to continue in order 
for their power to remain. This will lead to the final chapter, which consists of a study of 
the most controversial violence spawning from the area- the issue of piracy off the coast 
of Somalia into the Gulf of Aden. Thousands of ships traverse this area annually, and the 
numbers of attacks are growing exponentially. Is piracy another fissure leading to 
ultimate state collapse, or merely a symptom of state failure when locals are given no 
other option for survival? Finally, for the millions of Somalis trapped in the hourglass of 
anarchy, one that may soon implode, suggestions will be made that may eradicate the 
symptoms of state failure in the hopes of the recreation of institutions and government 
apparatuses.   
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  “NOUGHT CAN DEFORM THE HUMAN RACE LIKE THE  
 
    ARMOUR’S IRON BRACE70”    
 
     CHAPTER TWO 
 
“We came to your country for one reason only,” President Bush told the Somali 
people in December 1992, “to enable the starving to be fed.71” 
Failed Intervention on Behalf of the United States 
 As the aforementioned quote alludes, humanitarian intervention in Somalia in the 
early 1990s, led by the United States, was a failure for which popular resentment still 
exists to this day. Imagery of the massive hunger and displacement caused by the civil 
war under Somali warlords had reached the American public, to which the government 
responded by proposing its participation, believing it to be essentially cost-free 
politically72. Little known to the public at large, the country had already been receiving a 
substantial amount of aid; the famine-like conditions were caused by warlords 
themselves, withholding an estimated eighty percent of food aid as a means of coercion. 
More than 300,000 Somalis had already perished in the anarchic conditions, and the rapid 
escalation of fighting and drought was assuming the lives of close to one thousand 
victims a day. Under President Bush, deployments of 30,000 troops were sent to secure 
ports and roads that connected aid distribution centers. Its original aim was to steer clear 
of military situations on the ground- unless directly put in the position to fight warlords’ 
opposition groups that were contributing to the mass starvation73. Also clear under the 
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intervention was that there was intention of changing the decentralized power held by 
politically factionalized warlords, whether by means of disarmament or ‘nation-building’.  
 Soon thereafter, however, the terms of occupation changed dramatically. The 
break from the original mission was due, for the most part, to the political transition in 
leadership and ideology when the Clinton administration assumed the presidency. 
Chaired by new U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Madeleine K. Albright, the 
recently appointed bureaucracy stormed the U.N. with newfound zeal for “assertive 
multilateralism,” “nation-building,” and in Albright’s own words, “an unprecedented 
enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country.74” Though the 
original mandate co-signed by the U.S. and the U.N. slated complete U.S. withdrawal for 
that same year, the Clinton-Albright extension of policy resulted in a new U.N. Security 
Council Resolution (814) that kept 9,000 U.S. troops in the country. This increase was 
never discussed with Congress75. The U.S./U.N. collaboration, the first humanitarian 
intervention of its kind, was blind-sided by the events that spawned out of their attempt to 
assume sovereignty in an area where they had mistakenly assumed that none existed. 
Further analysis of the failed intervention on the behalf of the U.N. will be discussed later 
in the chapter. For the purposes of understanding the United States’ involvement, the 
most important event was that which has been popularly dubbed ‘Black Hawk Down’- 
when the bodies of seventeen U.S. soldiers were dragged through the dusty Somali 
streets, after their helicopter was gunned down by insurgents, where their tortured bodies 
were met with cheering by locals on the streets. Within days, the formerly ambitious 
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Clinton Administration, in a move to save face, withdrew U.S. troops, with $1.7 billion 
dollars already spent76, and very little to show for it. 
 
“Many of the region’s Muslims saw the Ethiopian invasion as a Christmas present 
from Ethiopia’s leaders to America’s.77” 
The U.S. Fails To Learn From the Blunders of the First Intervention 
 A little over a decade later, in 2006, the United States once again found itself 
embroiled in Somalia’s domestic affairs. Fearing the Islamic foundations of the ICU, and 
believing the group to have ties to known terrorist organizations, the Bush administration 
planned to orchestrate its downfall. As the majority of U.S. military strength was focused 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the administration sought out the collaboration of neighboring 
Ethiopia to intervene on their behalf. Exploiting their advantage as one of the few African 
countries with a Christian majority, the Ethiopian government harped on exaggerated 
terrorist claims to be privy to vast American funds and military resources78. Ethiopian 
leaders quickly took advantage of the alliance to invade from the bordering Ogaden 
region, and eventually to the capital, though many Somalis claimed the Ethiopian military 
had already covertly (and illegally) been occupying the area. 
 As previously discussed in the first chapter, the ICU viewed the Ethiopian 
presence as an invasion by a foreign enemy, and threatened violence against the troops in 
the form of a jihad. In response, the Ethiopian government declared that it was 
“technically at war with the Islamic Courts,” and a month later a resolution was passed in 
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the Ethiopian Parliament authorizing its military to “take all legal and necessary measures 
against any invasion by the [ICU].79” The resolution allowed force if no peaceful option 
was found, which it was not, and extended its authorization to military actions within 
Somalia, even though the resolution expressly states that measures are to be taken against 
invasion. It took little time for the thousands of Ethiopian armed forces to drive the ICU 
underground and out of power, yet the troops remained in the region for the next three 
years waging terror on Somali civilians.  
 Violence in the form of shelling entire neighborhoods, arrests and detentions, 
looting, assault and even rape became daily occurrences80. An inquisition by the United 
Nations documented the Ethiopian military’s use of white phosphorous bombs in heavily 
populated civilian areas, which literally melted the people it came in contact with81. 
During one major three-day offensive, the Ethiopian military allegedly went on a killing 
spree in Mogadishu that resulted in the deaths of over 2,400 Somalis, a great majority of 
which were women and children82. Hundreds of others were kidnapped and detained in 
secret prisons where they were tortured until the Ethiopian officers collected bribes for 
their release83. Native Ethiopian journalist A /Rasaq Nuurre claims that ransoms reached 
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upwards of $3,000 (U.S.),84 and TFG officials often shared in the plunder. Despite 
numerous reports by human rights organizations documenting these atrocities as both war 
crimes and human rights violations, with similar evidence found by an independent 
investigation commissioned by the European Union85, the international community did 
little to stop the Ethiopian military, and all parties involved remain unpunished. These 
accusations are hardly a new occurrence for the Ethiopian military that for years has 
maintained despicable human rights records, all the while receiving thousands of dollars 
for human rights training from the United States86. 
 In January 2009, two years after the Ethiopian government proclaimed its success 
in defeating the ICU, troops finally began to withdraw from the region due to a lack of 
funds87. Since the Ethiopian presence did little to support the transitional government in 
power (the TFG) during their occupation, vicious infighting broke out amongst Islamic 
and warlord factions scrounging for power in the vacuum left after their departure. To 
make matters worse, the past three and a half years of violence had caused over a million 
Somalis to flee their homes, refugee camps were little more than dilapidated centers of 
disease, and three and a half million people now faced impending famine88. Civil war 
again ravaged the country, rendering Somalia a much greater security threat to the 
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international community than it allegedly was under the ICU before the U.S.-backed 
Ethiopian intervention. While the ICU admittedly used violence in the form of corporal 
punishment against criminals, their main tenet had been the promotion of peace through 
shari’a law. The Islamist factions that were left post-invasion were radicalized groups 
with the ability to wield violence, angry from the years of belligerent occupation, whose 
tenets were driven by a hatred of Ethiopia and the United States89. In a strangely fatalistic 
irony, the United States managed to replace a moderate Islamic government with a 
radical Islamic hegemony led by Al-Shabaab, a group openly supported by al Qaeda90.  
 While it has already been established that countless human rights violations went 
unpunished during this time, questioning the legality of the entire operation is also 
warranted. The common view amongst Somalis was that Ethiopia has always tried to 
control the area91, and the intervention allowed Ethiopian rule by proxy. This feeling is 
further propagated by the Ethiopian government’s continuous appeals to the U.N. and the 
African Union (A.U.) to allow them to occupy the south and central regions of Somalia92. 
Wahde Belay, the spokesperson for the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry, maintains that the 
government’s actions in 2006 were legitimated by “a clear and present danger posed 
against Ethiopia [by the ICU],93” justifiable since states have the inherent right to self-
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defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter94. Furthermore, the government insists that 
the former TFG President and Parliament supported the occupation, although the validity 
of their support is questionable at best. The TFG hardly represents the will of the Somali 
populace; the bureaucracy was created and supported solely by the international 
community, not constitutionally elected, and the TFG never assumed responsibility for 
the people or established a monopoly of coercion.  
 While it is true that the ICU publicly declared jihad against Ethiopia in 2006, they 
had no intention of waging warfare outside of Somali borders. It is also true that there 
were some violent incursions between the two groups in late 2006 in the northern region, 
but Ethiopian forces easily defeated the ICU and forced nearly the entirety of the group 
underground or into exile within a few months. The legitimacy of the Ethiopian 
government’s claim to self-defense is further waned by the fact that their internationally 
funded and trained soldiers were pitted against an ICU ‘militia,’ composed of local men 
with little or no formal training. Seen through this lens, the “threat” posed to Ethiopia 
constitutes little more than propaganda publicly touted to hide the government’s true 
agenda. Furthermore, Ethiopian forces remained in Somalia for nearly three years after 
defeating the ICU, where the only ‘enemies’ fought in the ICU’s absence were innocent 
civilians, all bank-rolled by the United States government. 
“The rationale was clear. Since al-Qaeda used a failed state- Afghanistan- as a base 
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and attacked Western interests, the US should treat all failed states, especially in the 
Muslim World, as a security threat.95” 
‘War On Terror’ Breeds an Obsession With Terrorism 
 As the aforementioned quote suggests rather blatantly, the United States seemed 
to take on a blanket approach against any group deemed a “terrorist” faction in failed 
states. With little proof, the U.S. offered vast military and financial support to Ethiopia to 
fight the ICU, erstwhile conducting air raids that allegedly targeted known terrorists, 
most notably those supposedly responsible for attacks on two U.S. embassies in East 
Africa in the late 1990s96. While the U.S. celebrated the fact that the air strikes killed the 
likes of Aden Hashi Ayro (leader of Al-Shabaab prior to his death in 2007)97, Somalis 
mourned the fact that close to 6,000 civilians were also killed by the bombardments, and 
nearly one million more were forced to flee98. To make matters worse, in 2009 U.S. 
intelligence operatives confiscated documents that proved, despite Osama bin Laden’s 
intentions of expanding power bases into Somalia, al Qaeda was unable to seize control 
or acquire support from Somali natives. Errant militants could yield much higher profits 
working as freelance bullies for local warlords, while average Somalis were put off by 
the violent “jihadi-style” of Islam touted by al Qaeda99. Moreover, while the U.S. 
upholds its claim that Somalis are harboring the perpetrators of various attacks against 
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U.S. and Israeli offices in East Africa, there are no known terrorist attacks, outside of the 
immediate area, where Somali natives played a role100. 
 Even after the Ethiopian occupation debacle, the U.S., led especially by Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton, continues to define Somalia as a “terrorist safe haven”. While 
alleged links to al Qaeda remain the over-arching threat, the explosion of maritime piracy 
in the area has also been lumped in as a terrorist amalgamation. While it is true that the 
two constitute valid security threats, pirates are in no way in cahoots with the radical 
Islamist factions in Somalia. For starters, the two occupy separate areas of the country- 
pirates lay claim to the vast coastline cities of the Puntland region, whereas Al-Shabaab 
(the only radical Islamist faction with substantial territorial control) occupies the south. 
Although both groups pillage for profit, Al-Shabaab’s roving public courts condemn 
known pirates to death. Even the shipping industry denounces links between the two; in 
fact, if there were proof that pirates were engaged in acts of terrorism, the oft-given 
ransom payments would be illegal101. Piracy is an act of organized crime by non-state 
actors, not an act of terrorism, since by its very definition piracy cannot be politically 
motivated. It is plausible, however, that the Obama administration needs to promote the 
view that the two groups inseparably belong under the “terrorist” heading in order to 
wield violence as the only legitimate response (such as when the Navy imparted force 
against the pirates who hijacked the Maersk Alabama in April 2009). Once pirates are 
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deemed terrorists, they fall “outside the reach of reason and of conventional warfare,” 
and possibly outside of real legal protection102. 
 With American public opinion in drastic decline from the widespread, war-hungry 
emotions prevalent after the events of September 11th, the government has had to 
construct new approaches to combat terrorism without trying to extend the military past 
its current engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. The newest solution has been to cut 
funding to the areas where it may be possible that terrorist organizations may benefit 
from humanitarian aid. While Somalia’s connections to terrorist organizations remains 
questionable, in October of 2009 the administration decided to suspend food aid to the 
area103, with little regard to the fact that close to four million Somalis survive solely on 
donated rations. Furthermore, prior to the suspension, the U.S. was the largest contributor 
of humanitarian aid in the area104. This suspension does have one exception though- the 
U.S. will continue to send $2 million and over 40 tons of arms to the TFUG105, despite 
multiple reports from human rights organizations of their corrupt practices and 
allegations of violence and cruelty waged against its own citizens.  
 Still, it was not enough for the U.S. to suspend humanitarian aid; later in 2009 the 
administration issued set conditions that NGOs and humanitarian agencies must comply 
with in order to receive the funding and support of the U.S. government. Since it is 
estimated that U.S. financial aid comprises close to seventy percent of most of the NGOs’ 
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coffers, it would be near impossible for these organizations to continue their operations in 
Somalia without it. Thus, humanitarian groups are mired in a catch-22- either they 
attempt to provide aid with the 25-30% of funds that they have left, or attempt to follow 
the conditions laid forth that are so restrictive that it makes it nearly impossible for the 
organizations to distribute goods to those most in need106. Even the United Nations 
publicly reported that their operations have been seriously hindered by these new 
restrictions, to the point of near failure107. Two very sad ironies have sprung up from the 
use of this legislation. First, just like the pirates and terrorists that the U.S. government is 
claiming to fight, the administration is fundamentally holding aid and relief supplies 
hostage from the millions that are on the brink of death in Somalia. Finally, the radical 
Islamist factions that do exist have been able to radicalize popular opinion amongst those 
left hungry by promoting the image of the United States as one who would rather let 
millions die by starvation in order to punish a handful of suspected terrorists. 
 Moreover, hatred towards the United States has been made even worse by the 
latest scandal that has finally caught the medias’ attention in Somalia, ‘the cash to 
warlords program’. Multiple reports allege that the U.S. government, through the use of 
Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) operatives, sought out the help of local warlords 
during the height of ICU power in 2006. Despite the knowledge of endemic corruption 
and violence enacted by these very warlords, C.I.A. operatives were allegedly given 
briefcases full of cash to bribe the warlords to ally with the U.S. for the covert “Alliance 
for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism” mission. Once given the cash, 
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warlords were provided with a list of suspected terrorists that they were to capture and 
send to secret foreign locations. One warlord that claims he refused since ‘he could not be 
bought’ was Osman Hassan Ali Atto, the top financier of the Black Hawk Down attack in 
1993108! Another infamous warlord, Mohamad Qanyare, says that he was a lead emissary 
to the mission, as the C.I.A. operatives used his private airport to funnel in agents, cash 
and ammunition, while funneling the terrorists on the list out. Supposedly, those involved 
even stayed at Qanyare’s mansion and traveled with his personal ‘security team’ of thugs 
for protection. Though Qanyare claims that only about twenty people were captured and 
sent through his airport under the program, the warlords received upwards of $100,000 in 
cash per month, and substantially more funding in the form of supplies109. 
 While the U.S. government disclosed to the United Nations that it was sending the 
funds allegedly involved from this mission to the TFG for reinforcement, in reality, it 
only served to undermine the transitional government by providing funding and 
legitimacy to warlords that openly opposed the TFG. Multiple reports of the funding 
funneled through this mission provide another source of major contradictions, while it is 
likely that exact figures will probably never be known. A letter to the U.N. Security 
Council from Alejandro D. Wolff (the deputy permanent U.S. representative to the U.N.) 
admits that $2 million was sent “to the Somali government” at the time, “for the 
immediate procurement of equipment (weapons and ammunition) and logistics support 
(food, fuel, water, engineering services).110” However, a State Department official who 
wished to remain anonymous admitted to Foreign Policy magazine that well over that 
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amount was spent, with $1.25 million alone consisting of “cash in a brown paper bag.111” 
Despite a U.N. arms embargo to Somalia, another report alleges that shipments also 
included upwards of nineteen tons of ammunition, including grenades, machine guns, 
mortars and anti-aircraft weaponry112. These shipments continued until the Islamists 
drove the warlords out of the major cities, and the Americans, along with their suitcases 
full of cash, seemed to disappear almost overnight113.  
 
“Ironically, however, the international community bears much of the responsibility 
for creating the monster it now fears.114” 
U.S. Is Not the Only Entity Culpable; U.N. and Similar Humanitarian Organizations Are 
Also to Blame for Failure 
 Similar to policy changes made during the presidential administration change in 
the United States, the U.N. mission to Somalia also morphed from an intervention touted 
solely under the guise of providing food aid to one that championed “nation-building.” 
The secretary-general to the U.N. expanded the initial terms of the intervention to include 
his ambitious desires to disarm warlords, defuse land mines in the north, set up various 
civil administrations, and even establish and train a Somali police force115. Suddenly, 
both the U.S. and the U.N. seemed ready to employ military force to achieve 
humanitarian goals, resulting in the passage of a new U.N. Security Council Resolution 
(794) in 1992, which authorized, “the use of all necessary means to establish as soon as 
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possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.116” Despite 
the immense power now accorded to U.N. troops under Resolution 794, they were 
consistently met with failure because of their inability to determine which Somali actors 
to deal with. Countless clans and sub-clans factionalized Somalia’s political landscape, 
where in each area warlords claimed the legitimate authority to rule. The U.N. simply 
was not prepared to deal with the daunting task of separating “good” leaders from the 
“bad”, and warlords easily used U.N. concessions for egomaniacical motives of gaining 
heightened power and legitimacy. Many began to wonder if any real leaders existed in 
Somalia at all117. At the same time, the Somali people lost faith and respect for U.N. 
peacekeepers for giving even more power to former gang leaders who had purposefully 
starved their own people118. Before intervention, warlords demanded acquiescence 
through the business end of a gun- after the U.N. intervened it came for free. 
 Another major source of conflict stemmed from the June 5th incident where forces 
allegedly under the command of warlord General Mohamad Farah Aideed attacked UN 
peacekeepers, killing twenty-three and wounding many others. Shortly thereafter, the 
U.N. Security Council adopted another resolution, 837, which authorized Aideed’s arrest. 
This was not the first time that Aideed had hindered the peacekeepers’ work; prior to 
major UNOSOM engagement, Aideed rejected the U.N.’s call to deploy additional 
peacekeepers to the area when U.N.-owned facilities and trucks were being looted, with 
aid later sold on the black market119. Added to the hostility and commotion was the role 
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of the U.N. Special Envoy to Somalia, the American Admiral Jonathan Howe. Admiral 
Howe was supposedly the strongest advocate for punishing Aideed120; some writers 
condemn him as being “blood thirsty.” These sources are quick to point the finger of 
blame directly at Howe, claiming he obscured the mission, making it unclear whether the 
goal was to deliver aid supplies, or disarm and punish Aideed and similar political 
nuisances of the day121. The lack of clarity was apparent to Somalis, and UNOSOM 
forces quickly gained a bad reputation while losing natives’ trust. 
 Just as the United States bears a substantial burden for its failures in the 
humanitarian intervention of the early 1990s, so too has the U.N. been tarnished for these 
malfeasances. The collaboration between the U.S. and the U.N. on the mission itself was 
convoluted and confusing, further fuddled by rushing into an intervention that was the 
first of its kind. Since all other interventions undertaken by the United Nations had been 
with the host country’s consent122, the lack of prior precedent to assist the member states 
served only to work against their collaborative efforts. Added to this confusion was a real 
disconnect between the vision and goals of the U.S. and U.N. for Somalia. Both sides’ 
visions morphed and expanded over time. Without real knowledge of the political 
situation on the ground, both powers assumed that they would be greeted as liberators for 
feeding the hungry, and that they would be able to put an end to rampant poverty while 
building lasting Western-style government institutions. Both failed to notice that 
Somalia’s problems were hardly caused by a lack of people who had stepped forward to 
assume governmental power, instead there were too many actors involved, all of which 
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had done so for corrupt and self-interested reasons. This misstep, combined with a rapid 
withdrawal from the intervention, condemned the mission to failure.  
 So it seemed that as quickly as they had come to Somalia, on March 1, 1995, all 
U.N. involvement in the area ceased, and NGOs and similar companies disappeared 
along with the U.S. and U.N. forces. Despite half a decade of intervention, peacekeepers 
left little visible change in the war-ravished country. Since during occupation U.N. forces 
neglected to disarm the warlords, proclaiming it to be a task that exceeded their 
mandate123, conditions were ripe for civil war to ensue in the power vacuum left by their 
absence. Situations on the ground were little different from that under the violent 
warlords who had grappled for power after the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. 
Moreover, the operation had cost the international community more than $1.6 billion124, 
while the number of people that relied on food aid in order to survive had barely changed. 
Except for a newfound hatred of the West, it was as if humanitarian intervention never 
occurred at all. Sociologist Virginia Luling puts it best; in terms of accomplishments, the 
intervention, “at most… froze the war in place for a time.125” 
 
“Somalia again will be ruled by men with guns. We will have to escape, just as the 
UN is doing.126” 
U.N. Troops Withdraw From Somalia Only To Remain Embroiled In Its Problems 
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 While the U.N. forces from UNOSOM left in 1995, and Somalia quickly 
catapulted back into civil war, some private organizations remained to attempt to assuage 
the humanitarian emergencies that still persisted. A small U.N. contingent for Somalia 
remained behind, but moved their headquarters and storage facilities to neighboring 
Nairobi, Kenya, and remained largely hands-off from intervening across the border. Aid 
money also continued funneling into the area, but it became the next point of contention 
for U.N. failure. The U.N. is still unable to reconcile the vast amount of aid that has been 
purely wasted over the course of the last twenty years, while openly admitting that only a 
mere fraction has ever reached its intended recipients. Most often, the money is divided 
amongst corrupt officials who use it for their own personal means. Even during the height 
of UNOSOM’s mission in Somalia in 1993, only an estimated 4.5% of its $1.5 billion 
annual budget ended up in the local economy127. Today, the money is stolen before it 
even reaches warlords and corrupt TFUG members in Somalia. Through a process called 
“backfilling,” the Ugandan government, whose military forces are rented using funds 
from the U.N. to protect TFUG officials, creates or forges documents that allegedly show 
items that were “given” to the Somali military or TFUG. This aid money from the recent 
$10 million U.S. grant is then used to “refund” the Ugandan government. TFUG senior 
officers sometimes sign off as “witnesses” on the fictitious documents, suggesting that 
they probably benefit from the spoils as well128. 
 Unfortunately, even more funds are wasted by the U.N. itself, which still insists 
on maintaining its headquarters in Nairobi, one of the most expensive cities in all of 
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Africa129. Depicted by many Somali journalists as “the small Manhattan of East Africa,” 
the U.N. has essentially bankrolled the area, cycling hundreds of thousands of dollars 
through its local economy while also being one of the country’s main employers130. 
Moving certain U.N. facilities to the safer parts of Somalia would be extremely beneficial 
to all parties involved; the U.N. would save tons of money that it could instead use for 
food aid, while it would also provide hundreds of jobs in an area devastated by massive 
unemployment. In fact, one of the reasons that the Somali economy remained so stable in 
the early-to-mid 1990s was because of the many new companies who had brought money 
into the area while vying for U.S. and U.N. contracts. During the UNOSOM intervention, 
the U.N. was the primary employer in Mogadishu, and large extended families could 
survive off of one worker’s salary alone. For a much cheaper wage than what they 
currently offer in their Kenyan headquarters, the salary of one U.N.-employed Somali 
worker was sometimes enough to feed up to eighty people131. When UNOSOM forces 
withdrew in 1995, U.N. employment, and the private companies who used local 
employment to fulfill U.N. contracts, withdrew with them. 
 Despite the continuance of lucrative aid contracts, conditions for aid workers in 
Somalia are even worse today than they were pre-intervention twenty years ago. With 
endemic corruption present in each transitional government brought to power by the 
                                                 
129 Idle, Mohamed. “Somalia: The Humanitarian Tremor Midfielders.” Hiiraan Online. 22 Jan. 
2009. (02). <http://www.hiiraan.com/op2/2010/jan/Somalia_the_humanitarian 
_tremor_midfielders.aspx> 
130 Nuurre, A /Rasaq H. “How Kibaki’s Gimlet Eyes Espied Somalia’s Southern Coastline” 
Hiiraan. 13 June 2009. (04). <http://www.hiiraan.com/op2/2009/jun/how_kibaki_s_gimlet_ 
eyes_espied_somalia_s_southern_coastline.aspx>; Onyango-Obbo, Charles. “Kenya Should 
Thank God For Its Somali Troubles” The Daily Nation. 4 Feb. 2010. (02). <http://www.hiiraan. 
com/op2/2010/feb/Kenya_should_thank_god_for_its_somali_troubles.aspx> 
131 Atadika, Novisi. “Adapting To Anarchy” Harvard International Review. 18.4 (Fall 1996). 
(41).  
 48 
international community, humanitarian workers cannot even be sure whether attacks are 
the doings of rogue agents and warlords or commissioned by the “legitimate” 
government132. The situation on the ground for foreigners has become so dangerous in the 
past few years that nearly a third of all humanitarian casualties worldwide occur in the 
area, even more than in Afghanistan133. Often depicted as “the most dangerous place in 
the world,” even the head of the U.N. Development Program was not safe; gunmen in 
Mogadishu assassinated him while he visited the area in 2008134. Aid workers attempting 
to deliver supplies are often held up at makeshift roadside checkpoints, where warlords 
extort “fees,” often loot the trucks of its supplies, and sometimes even kidnap the workers 
to hold them for ransom. Humanitarian agencies must spend great portions of their 
budgets obtaining private security and paying off fees in the form of protection rackets to 
local militias. In the midst of global recession, and with the new strict aid guidelines 
imposed by the United States, many aid organizations have been forced to “flood the 
markets” with food aid, instead of delivering it directly to recipients, in the hopes that 
some of it will “trickle down to those most in need.135” With the security situation 
worsening with each passing month, and finances running thin, many organizations have 
been forced to withdraw from the area, at a time when locals need their presence the 
most.  
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 The current restrictions on aid also raise doubts over the ability for humanitarian 
groups in the area to remain neutral, when the very cornerstone of non-governmental 
organizations is their ability to send aid to those in need regardless of the political 
situation on the ground. While the U.S. maintains that its funding stipulations are 
justifiable because it keeps aid out of the hands of terrorists, it neglects to understand that 
it is also keeping aid out of the mouths of millions of starving Somalis, in order to punish 
a few bad men. Charity given with a political agenda attached fails to recognize the 
reality of the true emergency that exists on the ground, while similarly binding formerly 
neutral organizations to the endemic corruption of the current political arena. Instead of 
being able to assist those in need, aid becomes a contributor to the conflict136. Still, the 
bottom line is that without access to aid, four million people will die from starvation in 
2010. To Somalis, the notion that the international community is comfortable with 
condemning that many people to death, is proof of a real act of terrorism. 
 
“The Beggar’s Rags, Fluttering In Air, Does To Rags the Heavens Tear…137” 
The U.N. Has Not Upheld Its Commitments to Somalia 
 Another problem that stems from U.N. failure is its inability and unwillingness to 
police the ceasefires and the arms embargo that it put in place through the passage of 
multiple Security Council Resolutions. Even the United States has admittedly violated the 
arms embargo, distributing ammunition to transitional governments and warlords alike, 
without penalty from the U.N. In fact, prior to the fall of the Siad Barre regime, the U.S. 
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was the lead supplier of arms to Somalia138. It is a well-known fact that the very arms 
distributed from U.N.-member governments end up for sale on the black market; some 
are even sold openly on the streets139. Warlords have admitted that since the 
hyperinflation and decline of the Somali shilling, arms have become a form of currency, 
sometimes given out at clan meetings as payments to their respective militias. Using arms 
and ammunition instead of cash has resulted in the availability of the greatest number and 
variety of small arms available on the Somali market today than any other time since the 
early 1990s, and the fall of the last legitimate governmental regime140. To make matters 
worse, in recent times, the easiest means to channel guns into the black market has been 
through TFG/TFUG security force desertion. In the past two years alone, 14,000 of the 
17,000 forces have deserted, most because they have not been paid for their duties, and it 
is common for deserters to take their guns and uniforms with them141. The majority of the 
TFUG’s ammunitions have been provided, free of charge, by the United States 
government. 
 Further questions of legality also plague the U.N. Security Council for its 
compliance with the U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion in Somalia in 2006. That December, 
the Council passed Resolution 1725, which allowed the mandate of force to combat 
international terrorism under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, where international 
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terrorism is slated as a “threat to international peace and security.142” Disregarding 
multiple reports from independent companies that maintained that the ICU was not a 
terrorist organization, the passage of the resolution negated the U.N.’s own charter by 
allowing an aggressor (Ethiopia) to turn a peaceful situation in Somalia under the ICU to 
one of war. Moreover, the ICU was not internationally recognized as the legitimate 
government of Somalia. Thus, the U.N. intervened on the behalf of a party “struggling for 
political supremacy,” yet another task that goes against the duties and powers of the 
U.N143. While consent of the state is not needed for the U.N. to be able to intervene on its 
behalf144, the ICU had brought a semblance of peace to Somalia that had not been seen 
for fifteen years- one that the U.N. itself had not been able to accomplish in its own 
intervention. Still, legitimacy was given to Ethiopia allowing the invasion. The U.N. even 
documented human rights abuses on the behalf of the Ethiopian military, and to this day 
refuses to bring the perpetrators to justice. 
 Through all of these examples, it is clear that the international community, over 
the course of the past two decades, failed to achieve its only goal of humanitarian 
assistance: ensuring the fundamental human rights that are necessary for survival. Despite 
fifteen attempts to create governmental apparatuses, each transitional government that 
came into power proved just as corrupt as the last, while the Somali people have yet to 
recognize any of the governments that came to power as legitimate. Moreover, the 
international community still will not allow grass roots involvement by the Somali people 
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when establishing these transitional governments, fueling anger over the denial of 
Somalis’ rights to self-sovereignty. Teenagers who have lived their entire lives without 
the auspices of working institutions overload the streets, where they are easily recruited 
to carry out the dirty work of warlords and radical Islamist groups, since there are no 
schools for them to attend, and no jobs available besides being a pirate or a gun-for-hire 
in local militias. Upwards of eight billion dollars in aid, spent since 1991, has done little 
to effect minimum standards of public health145. Mortality rates have increased, 
vaccinations are only available on the black market (where medicines that are sold are 
often expired)146, while proper sanitation systems and clean drinking water remain a pipe 
dream. Shelter is limited- refugee camps are overloaded and are often so unsanitary that 
they become little more than centers of disease and death.  
 Unfortunately, little can be done to overturn these consequences that resulted 
from the past twenty years of humanitarian failures. The only recompense must be in the 
lessons that the international community may glean from its losses. What must be 
recognized is the fact that humanitarian interventions, despite their well-intentioned 
causes, cannot be separated from the politics of all of the countries involved (both those 
that give and those that receive the aid). It is unrealistic to expect that humanitarian forces 
will not come into direct conflict with government and/or non-state actors that presently 
occupy the power vacuums left over by the void of state failure pre-intervention. 
Furthermore, clear and unchanging goals, and those who are responsible for enacting and 
achieving those goals, must be established from the very beginning. While it is 
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understandably difficult to find trustworthy leaders with which to engage in a failed state, 
natives must play key roles in humanitarian intervention. Without this, countries 
supplying the aid run the risk of being viewed as a “colonizer,” or an international body 
that wishes to impart its rule despite the inherent sovereignty of the receiving nation. 
Lack of support from locals breeds lack of trust, resulting in a vast array of security 
issues. Just as Clausewitz suggested, military intervention is akin to war, even if 
undertaken for humanitarian purposes; it is little more than “policy by different 
means.147” 
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 “NOBODY HIRES A CHAUFFER WHO CANNOT DRIVE  
 
 BECAUSE OF CLAN PREFERENCE, WHY SHOULD WE ENTRUST  
 
 THE LEADERSHIP OF OUR OWN NATION OTHER THAN  
 
   THE RIGHT PERSON FOR THE JOB148” 
 
     CHAPTER THREE 
 
“Mr. Prime Minister, a government by the warlords, for the warlords; a 
government for the middlemen by the middlemen, cannot be for its people.149” 
Illegitimate Transitional Federal Governments 
 Despite being appointed in 2003, the TFG under President Abdullahi Yusuf 
remained in exile for five years, unable to exert any form of control over Somalia. When 
President Yusuf and his bureaucracy first attempted to enter the capital city in 2004, an 
immediate assassination attempt was made on the Interim Prime Minister Ali Mohammed 
Ghedi150. Members of the TFG’s bureaucracy held little to no legitimacy in the eyes of 
the Somali populace. It was widely known that many officials came to power through 
bribes or threats, most lacked experience and education, and some had been sworn in 
despite disqualification by an Advisory Committee because of individuals’ record for 
human rights violations and war crimes151. President Yusuf himself had a history of being 
a militant dictator who, during his reign as President of the semi-autonomous Puntland 
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area, refused to leave office after successfully eliminating all political opposition to his 
regime. In fact, he left only when the internationally sponsored Peace and Reconciliation 
Conference in Kenya elected him President of Somalia152. During his reign in Puntland, 
he also established questionable relationships with the Ethiopian government, prompting 
fear amongst locals153. Interim Prime Minister Ghedi’s politics were also pro-Ethiopian; 
supposedly Ghedi told the Ethiopian government during a visit to Addis Ababa that the 
previous five hundred years of fighting represented little more than “an artificial 
misunderstanding.154” 
 Even upon the TFG’s return to Mogadishu, they were unable to establish control 
past the distance of a few blocks, and remained sequestered in Villa Somalia, heavily 
guarded by U.N.-sponsored Ugandan and Burundi military men. The TFG did little to 
rectify state failure, did not collect taxes, provide goods or social services, or establish 
civilian law enforcement organizations. The TFG could hardly claim to speak on the 
behalf of Somalis who detested its very existence- instead the international community at 
large provided the TFG with the legitimacy it lacked from its own people. It was hard to 
deny that the lives of the Somali people became considerably worse after the ICU was 
driven underground in 2006. For example, by the spring of 2007, there were no hospital 
beds left in Mogadishu, and all forms of legal commerce had halted155. Furthermore, 
some ministers within TFG ranks allegedly joined a rival quasi-government group called 
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the Somali Rehabilitation and Redemption Council (SRRC), a group whose ideology 
often differed from that of the TFG, all the while refusing to resign from their 
internationally appointed posts in the TFG156. 
 Just as the warlords had done during the Somali civil wars of the past, the TFG 
carried out violence against its own people. An independent investigation led by 
Germany’s ambassador to Somalia, Walter Lindner (highly important at the time, since 
Germany also held the European Union presidency) found that TFG officials carried out 
air strikes using forms of heavy artillery in highly populated civilian areas, bombed 
hospitals and schools, raped hundreds of women, and continuously blocked humanitarian 
supplies from reaching its intended recipients- either by looting or demanding high fees 
at illegally established roadblocks157. While the West publicly maintains that it abhors 
these actions, they have done little to attempt to punish officials involved or attempt to 
institute change. Denying responsibility for the atrocities neglects the fact that the TFG 
forces were trained by, and received their salaries from, the U.N. Development 
Program158. Regardless of their lack of control on the ground, the international 
community lauded the TFG as the only ‘real solution’ for the failed state. Thus, many 
Somalis rejoiced when the terms of the TFG mandate expired in January 2009, and 
another international conference was commissioned in Djibouti to create the next 
transitional government. 
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“The country exists more on paper and in the eyes of the State Department than in 
reality. The internationally recognized ‘government’ can only dream of having so 
much authority.159” 
Transitional Federal Unity Government; Equally A Failure? 
 Initially, the TFUG enjoyed some support from Somalis after former Islamic 
cleric Shiekh Sharif Ahmed was chosen as the new president160. Interestingly, the 
international community also celebrated his election, despite Ahmed being a former 
leader in the ICU’s ranks, which four years ago the U.S. and Ethiopia had dismantled and 
run underground. Many believed that Ethiopian support was given to the new 
government only after a good number of pro-Ethiopian leaders occupied positions in the 
transitional presidential bureaucracy and Parliament, allowing the Ethiopian government 
to maintain control in Somalia without having to allocate funds for occupation in 
Mogadishu (which it could no longer afford)161. Despite its pro-Ethiopian agendas, for 
the first time in the fifteen attempts by the international community to create transitional 
governments for Somalia, the Somali people attempted to throw support behind the new 
government out of respect for the Islamic leader and desperation for peace162.  
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 However, this feeling quickly subsided once the new leaders returned to 
Mogadishu from the conference in Djibouti. Unlike the former TFG president that was 
forced into exile, President Sheikh Sharif prefers to spend the majority of his time outside 
of the country, most often perusing foreign lands begging for aid163. The money is 
distributed amongst the president and bureaucratic ministers’ entourages, used on lavish 
hotels and other travel expenses, and never finding its way into Somalia’s war-torn 
economy. The lack of TFUG presence in the capital has resulted in the loss of at least half 
of the few blocks that the previous TFG had fought and won control over164. While 
President Sheikh Sharif insists in all of his global petitions that Somalia is not a failed 
state165, he hardly spends enough time within the country to make an educated guess 
about the situation on the ground. Instead, there is an expectation that the international 
community is responsible for mollifying the ever-present humanitarian emergencies 
resulting from massive starvation and displacement. The Somali public now views the 
TFUG as one dependent on others to do its job166, even if it means allowing foreign 
intervention and giving away state sovereignty to the highest bidder. 
 The TFUG will not even collaborate with local governments’ leaders who wish to 
actively engage in national politics. When the semi-autonomous region of Puntland 
attempted to co-opt the TFUG government for cooperation in its fight against the rampant 
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piracy in Somalia’s north shore, TFUG cabinet members annulled their agreement and 
decided that they would rather collaborate with Djibouti instead167. TFUG leaders balk at 
the thought of having local leaders involved in government programs and decisions, only 
further tarnishing what little legitimacy they may have had when first appointed. 
Moreover, President Sheikh Sharif, a former Islamic cleric, admitted that ninety-five 
percent of the TFUG’s forces did not have Islamic knowledge168, despite operating in the 
most homogenous Muslim country in the world. Thus few were surprised that the 
government’s militia often operated in tiny independent units, more loyal to one 
government warlord than the overall establishment169, and a contingent that had a near 
eighty three percent desertion rate. To make matters worse, the few that did stay were 
accused of human rights abuses and war crimes. 
 Yet the militia is still effective enough to wield terror against Somali citizens. 
Local Somali news media supposedly has collected footage of government officials 
intentionally shooting at civilians. Another report claimed that instead of transporting 
wounded children to hospitals during combat situations, they are driven to unknown areas 
from which they do not return170. After a recent roadside bomb explosion outside of a 
school in Mogadishu, TFUG forces raided the school, violently evacuated students and 
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teachers from the building, and then burned half of it to the ground171. Public disorder 
seems to be a favorite of the TFUG militia, who often wage air strikes in the crowded 
Bakara Market, insisting that the market is used to harbor terrorists172. Similarly, TFUG 
forces are most often responsible for the disruption of food aid, erecting hundreds of 
roadblocks where their armed cronies demanded as much as $500 (U.S.) per vehicle in 
order to pass. NGO workers are kidnapped and held for ransom, while others are simply 
detained in prisons without trial173. 
 
“Not to mention the numerous TFG regimes, comprising of uncommitted office 
seekers at best, and certifiable Ethiopian agents at worst, consistently failing to 
discharge even the most basic of their responsibilities to the public.174” 
Why Have Fifteen Attempts to Institute A Government Failed in Somalia? 
 Which factors explain why Somalia has been unable to maintain a central 
government has been the million-dollar question in the area for the past twenty years. 
This case study finds that there are three reasons for the prolonging and enduring 
government failure: it was created by the international community without local input; it 
still manages to put infamous and dangerous people into positions of power; and, 
structural faults in the institutions themselves promote failure. First, every government 
instituted after the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 has been commissioned, chosen 
and implemented by the international community with little to no consultation or 
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participation from the Somali public. Peace conferences often take place in nearby 
countries, such as Kenya and Djibouti, where their government officials have more say 
over leadership than the natives that will be put under their command. International 
efforts assume sovereignty and set up puppet and proxy governments that often prove 
more in-tune to the interests of the international community that fills its coffers. Finally, 
transitional governments are often subject to short term-limits, allowing the international 
community to ally itself with new actors nearly every two or more years. 
 The second reason- that dangerous people easily attain positions of power- is 
driven by the insatiable greed of local warlords. Acquiring political status allows them to 
easily extort funds while using violence and the suppression of humanitarian aid to 
attempt a monopoly of coercion. Constantly changing regimes have allowed Villa 
Somalia to become a revolving door for warlords who easily bribe their way into the 
ministries. Moreover, the international community has promoted leaders with little 
experience or education to high positions. Expecting such leaders to rectify the conditions 
of a state in failure or collapse is truly asking them to perform a task well beyond their 
means. Even current President Shiekh Sharif proved ill-prepared for the task, prompting 
an official who works in his administration to report to the Somalia media (anonymously) 
that, “Selecting Sheikh Sharif to run shattered Somalia is like asking one of us ordinary 
folks to run America’s space agency, NASA. He simply has no clue about what he’s 
really supposed to do.175” 
 Finally, structural faults inherent in transitional governments make it difficult for 
little-experienced leaders to overcome collapse. For instance, the TFUG has a parliament 
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that is based on clan-representation, called the 4.5 System. This means that the four main 
clans are allotted equal representation in parliament, about sixty-four seats a piece. The 
“.5” part represents the minority clans, which are given half representation, averaging 
around thirty-two seats per clan. This apportionment system caused the Parliament to 
swell to a whopping five hundred fifty members, one of the largest in the world176. To put 
this number in perspective, the United States has a population that is seventy-five times 
larger than Somalia’s, with about 430 members of Congress177. Many view the 4.5 
System as highly discriminatory, as Somalis from the four largest clans count as 100% of 
a person, while those from minority clans count as half. Furthermore, maintaining enough 
security to allow five hundred fifty bureaucrats to meet in one location is a Herculean 
task hardly ever undertaken; parliament positions actually exist more in name than real 
function. Since the current TFUG mandate will expire at the end of 2011, one can only 
imagine how large the bureaucracy may become. 
 
“The whole country has become a breeding ground for warlords, pirates, 
kidnappers, bomb makers, fanatical Islamist insurgents, freelance gunmen, and 
idle, angry youth with no education and way too many bullets.178” 
Non-State Actors Wield Power in Failed States When Defunct Governments Cannot 
 Non-state actors (NSAs), as defined by the Geneva Convention, are any 
“organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over 
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a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations.179” The cornerstone of NSAs is the use of force to achieve quasi-political 
objectives, even if only for selfish means. Without the confines of a working state, many 
types of NSAs will appear, all claiming the legitimate right to exercise violence as a 
means of control. Groupings of these actors may include militias, gangs, agents of 
regional bureaucrats, warlords and other clan leaders, pirates, some fundamentalist 
groups, and sometimes, defaulted state police or military units. At times these groups are 
driven to work together, uniting under a shared front, often against international 
occupation or aggression180. States that have collapsed, or are nearing failure, lack 
functioning judicial and security systems; people must forge alliances with NSAs to 
guarantee their security under protection rackets, which is not to say that NSAs do not 
brandish violence of their own against the people. 
 Protection rackets flourish in areas like Somalia, where military ammunition and 
freelance gunmen are bought and sold like market commodities181. Since protection 
rackets often constitute the main source of NSAs’ income, they have a great incentive to 
acquire weapons in large amounts. A classic example of protection rackets in Somalia is 
the hundreds of ‘roadblocks’ that line the streets, and especially target foreign and 
humanitarian vehicles. Armed thugs guard each roadblock, managing to extort hundreds 
of dollars in ‘fees’ and ‘taxes’. Non-compliance with the payments can result in 
kidnapping, beatings, and sometimes death. Other ways to bankroll NSAs’ activities 
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include the trade of illegal goods, piracy and human trafficking. Just as the modern state 
gained supremacy by efficiently providing public security182, NSAs acquire greater 
power with the higher amounts of security it is able to provide when the state is absent. 
 In places like Somalia, where weak governments exist but cannot claim a 
monopoly of coercion, NSAs often rival state authorities with better resources and 
capabilities. The state is a burden to NSAs who must compete with its apparatuses for 
coercive control. Ground conditions in a failed state, such as the expansion of a hidden 
economy and porous borders183, are all advantageous features for NSAs who “increase 
[their] odds of survival” by keeping their actions under the radar184. Unfortunately, state 
failure gives rise to NSAs who have an interest in the continuance of chaos and state 
collapse. Since the very atmosphere of statelessness has been a means for greatly 
expanding control, NSAs often have more to gain when and where the state no longer 
exists. Furthermore, while most NSAs want to expand their power, they hardly want to be 
responsible for the public at large, especially with responsibilities of governing such as 
legislating185. Moreover, states participate in the international community at large, where 
their actions may be criticized as well as threatened by others186. While it may be 
relatively easy for two states to fight one another, it is much harder for a sovereign state 
to fight against a stateless group whose leaders operate across multiple borders, making it 
easy to hide. 
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 Yet is it correct to assume that all NSAs worsen the already strained conditions of 
failed states, or is it possible that some may use their power to rebuild state structures? 
One need only look to the so-called ‘moneylords’ (big-business owners) of Somalia, who 
utilized their powers to deliver goods and services that the government had been unable 
to provide for over a decade. As discussed in the first chapter, the black market was 
actually relatively stable- despite years of civil warfare, the Somali shilling held a steady 
exchange rate for nearly eleven years187, until warlords printed their own currency. In 
response, the moneylords established efficient systems of barter; where transactions 
could be simplified, competition thrived188. The moneylords knew better than to trust in 
the corrupt protection rackets provided by local warlords, so the businessmen banded 
together to create their own system of security based on reciprocity and the trust of 
mutual protection189. Once their territories were secure, moneylords extended portions of 
their profits to the bettering of their communities without taxing locals. Within a few 
years the moneylords had created small but impressive basic systems of healthcare, 
education, telecommunication and even transportation in certain areas. Other 
accomplishments include the creation of power plants, private mail systems, and even a 
grandiose initiative to mend and rebuild the roads of Mogadishu190. 
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“We live in a situation where chaos is stability as both the TFG and the insurgents 
cannot survive without the sound of mortar bombs. A day of no shooting can evoke 
terror in their minds as they lose ground once peace dawns in Somalia.191” 
Radical Islam and the New NSAs Enjoying Power in Somalia 
 Unfortunately, the Somali story of NSA power hardly ends with the ‘good-cop-
bad-cop’ power struggle between moneylords and warlords. The U.S.-backed Ethiopian 
intervention in 2006 drove yet another NSA group to power- factionalized radical 
Islamists. While the U.S. had incorrectly assumed that the ICU was a terrorist 
organization, the splinter groups that emerged after the Ethiopian military drove the ICU 
from power may certainly be labeled as such today. The most notorious of these groups is 
al-Shabaab, which roughly translates as “the youth”, originally formed in opposition to 
the TFG192. After Ethiopian occupation, the group exploded into the south and central 
regions of Somalia, where it now enjoys power over exponentially larger swaths of land 
than the current TFUG government. Just as NSAs often benefit from the status quo of 
collapsed and failed states, al-Shabaab is constantly reinforced by Ethiopian threats and 
international involvement.  
 On the one hand, foreign presence in Somalia provided the radicals with a 
powerful recruitment tool, both domestically and abroad. Al-Shabaab welcomed jihadists 
from all over the globe, while attempting to engage the Diaspora to come back to their 
home country and join the fighting ranks193. On the other hand, it allowed Ethiopia to 
justify the 2006 intervention, and portray itself to the international community as the 
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Christian mainstay of the African continent194. Al-Shabaab soon cemented this image, as 
they declared their intent to widen the jihad to include both Westerners in Somalia and 
Somalis who worked for or with the West. These threats were made in direct response to 
the U.S. who, in March of 2008, designated al-Shabaab as an international terrorist 
organization, providing instant infamous legitimacy195. What is extremely frustrating for 
local Somalis, is that al-Shabaab is a radical group that is “not a Somali organization by 
its tradition, outlook, political goals or agenda, or even religious faith;” the group itself 
refuses to recognize Somalia as a nation and/or a state196. In fact, its very presence is a 
double-edged sword; al-Shabaab carries out violence against the Somali people while at 
the same time ensuring the presence of international actors in Somalia’s domestic affairs 
because of their ties to terrorism and the wide-ranging threats that they make against the 
West as a whole, as well as NGOs with ties to the West. 
 In 2009, al-Shabaab contingents forced the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) to 
withdraw from southern Somali cities, unless they acquiesced to a series of demands 
made to their organization- such as $20,000 in protection racket payments every few 
months, firing every female employee unless they worked in health centers197, and to 
purchase all food aid locally198. Forcing NGOs to withdraw was not enough though, so 
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some local aid workers turned up beheaded199, while organizations who attempted to 
fight back and protect themselves were met with al-Shabaab troops who fired at them 
from behind civilian human shields taunting the groups to return fire200. Fearing the 
spread of al-Shabaab’s terror over the border, Kenya has publicly vowed to “bloody al-
Shabaab’s nose” if the group attempts to attack citizens or NGOs within the country201. 
While al-Shabaab is undoubtedly a local terrorist organization wielding violence in 
Somalia, it is not a transnational organization with goals to create a united Islamic state 
consisting of the entirety of Muslim countries. Furthermore, despite establishing their 
supremacy in the southern areas of Somalia, al-Shabaab does not so much control the 
political landscape, but rather just occupies the territory occasionally committing 
violence in the street for their cause202. Even within the group forces are weak and 
divided, while resources in the form of money and manpower are waning203.  
 The only real power that al-Shabaab has against Somalis is implementing fear, 
and natives are most often the target of the jihad. In a disturbing incident that made 
international headlines last year, al-Shabaab half-buried a young girl in a public square 
and then stoned her to death, later publishing a video of the incident on YouTube©. The 
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“crime” for which she was killed was “her audacity to seek justice against her rapists,204” 
after multiple al-Shabaab militiamen in the town of Kismayo raped her without any form 
of punishment or justice after the fact. While dramatic horror stories like these quickly 
spread to the media, the daily violence impressed upon the population is simply ignored. 
It is not uncommon for an Al-Shabaab contingent to assassinate community nobles, 
elders, educators or reporters. Anyone who questions their actions, or is “not being 
enthusiastic enough about their organization,” may become a marked target. Youth 
assassins are tasked with following targets, and eventually told to murder them in public 
after they emerge from praying in the mosques205. Inasmuch that al-Shabaab masked 
militiamen launch gruesome attacks against those it deems ‘criminal’ or ‘immoral’, as 
well as those who do not offer their full support to their cause, it subsequently does not 
defend or protect a single Somali city from outside force206. It does not have a political 
agenda for Somalia past its current violent public demonstrations. Thus, considering al-
Shabaab to be the quasi-government in control of the southern regions of Somalia fails to 
recognize that this is a role that not even al-Shabaab wants. 
 
“A Truth That’s Told With Bad Intent Beats All the Lies You Can Invent…207” 
In fact, the Islamists May Be the Only Solution To Somalia’s Problems 
 Al-Shabaab’s inability to initiate a political agenda, or obtain a monopoly of 
coercion past taking its enemies into public squares to torture and kill them, suggests that 
dismantling the group may prove to be easier than currently thought. One group heading 
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this initiative is a moderate Islamic faction in Somalia called Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama. 
This native Somali organization, often just called Ahlu Sunnah for short, is a volunteer 
force largely drawn from the local clans and communities that it is currently protecting, 
and has been present in Somalia for years208. They are a non-militant spiritual group that 
also strongly opposes bloodshed, and is disgusted by the spread of violence for the 
purpose of political gains, especially terror that is supposedly carried out under the guise 
of Islam209. The emergence of armed factions of Ahlu Sunnah proves how desperate the 
situation on the ground really is, as these contingents maintain that they only began 
arming themselves out of desperation, and they employ full-fledged armed militias for 
the self-defense of Ahlu Sunnah members and the communities that it currently 
protects210. Ahlu Sunnah is also trying to negotiate collaboration with the TFUG, asking 
for a handful of ministry positions and ambassadorships in return for the attempted 
silencing of al-Shabaab211. As usual, President Sheikh Sharif refuses to collaborate with 
native Somalis for support and Ahlu Sunnah’s requests remain unanswered212. Despite 
the lack of collaboration, the group does not seek to depose or replace the TFUG, they 
say they will continue to support the government regardless of its decisions to 
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collaborate, while politics in general still remains very low on the group’s agenda. Their 
main tenet is to ensure the freedom for Somalis to be able to worship in peace213. 
 The presence of Ahlu Sunnah must serve as a lesson as well to the international 
community that often lumps all Islamist groups with some form of political ties under the 
‘terrorist organization’ heading, which is exactly what had happened to the ICU in 2006. 
Not every Islamist group consists of “extremists” or “jihadists,” nor does every group 
have the political agenda to wage terror in order to fight for its cause. If anything, the 
ICU proves that the Islamists are the potential solutions for peace in Somalia, since 
shari’a law is one tenet that the many different clan factions have been able to agree on. 
Finally, groups like Ahlu Sunnah have consistently remained the most trusted form of 
protection for the Somali people. They do not wage violence against the citizens, nor do 
they attempt to extort them of funds in exchange for security. 
 
“In the streets of Mogadishu, grazing cows and children sniffing glue compete to eat 
from piles of garbage.214” 
Who Is Supporting the Current Youth Generations of Somalia?  
 Despite the immense amount of information expressed earlier in this chapter 
about NSAs, one question remains largely unanswered- who is left in Somalia to help the 
youth generations that will one day become the country’s leaders? Statistical information 
suggests that children have been harmed the most by the consequences of state failure. 
Starvation and the unsanitary living conditions of forced mass migration has clamed the 
lives of three quarters of Somali children before they even reach the age of five. Over 
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half a million children have already perished in the conflict of the past twenty years, 
amounting to the literal loss of an entire generation215. The vulnerability of children 
living in warfare, combined with the sheer number who are simply abandoned by their 
parents and extended families, makes youth easy targets for soldiers and NSAs to recruit 
from, and at the same time represents the demographic that is the most difficult for NGOs 
and humanitarian aid agencies to reach.  
 There are no schools for children to attend. There are no vaccinations available 
for immunization against basic and treatable common childhood diseases216. Katherine 
Grant, the child protection specialist for the world-renowned humanitarian group 
UNICEF, reported in 2008 that upwards of 12,000 children would gather outside 
UNICEF’s offices on a daily basis needing emergency help217. The issues UNICEF were 
then tasked to deal with were problems faced by thousands of other street children in 
Somalia- “issues of family separation, child labor, [lack of] schooling, and the chronic 
poverty” that resulted in most going to bed hungry every night218. Children were forced 
onto the street because of mass refugee flows throughout the country, and many families 
are forced to abandon their children because the aid necessary to care for them is simply 
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unavailable219. Life on the streets also makes children easy targets for crimes like sexual 
abuse, assault and general exploitation220.  
 
“We are talking about teenagers who never knew anything but conflict and have 
never seen how a stable state functions. Youth who never had the opportunity to go 
to school now promulgate fatwahs.221” 
Youth Fall Prey to Radical Islamic Factions and Pirate Gangs 
 Absence of educational opportunities, massive unemployment and little hope for 
the future make young men the easiest targets for recruitment to radical Islamic 
contingents and pirate gangs. One may recall from the last chapter that the very name “al-
Shabaab” roughly translates to “the youth”. Warlords and criminals are looked up to as 
role models, since in the few remaining Somali villages, as well as in refugee camps, they 
are the only adults who bother with Somali children, albeit for self-interested reasons222. 
Thousands of youths attend jihadist training camps- the only schooling realistically 
available to them223. Even children living in Somali Diaspora communities are being 
tapped to fight in radical groups. Reports from senior counterterrorism officials in the 
United States allege that fifty or more children of Somali immigrants have left the U.S. to 
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fight in Somalia, “including one who earned the horrific distinction in the fall of 2008 as 
being the first American suicide bomber.224” 
 Once these groups have successfully recruited and trained children to fight for 
their cause, the youth are then tasked out to become freelance murderers and “guns-for-
hire” for warlords. Furthermore, many are given the responsibility of “child judges”- 
teenagers who must issue verdicts and deliver punishments such as “beheadings, stonings 
and amputations.225” Youth are ushered to the front row when radical factions engage in 
public displays of terror, such as the “trials” often given by al-Shabaab for thieves, 
murderers and rapists. While smaller radical groups and al-Shabaab publicly claim that 
the inclusion of children amongst their ranks is their way of “empowering youth,” the 
reality is that they train children as young as nine-years-old to carry heavy weaponry, and 
prompt them to use these weapons against their own people226. These groups are also 
infamous for introducing children to the popular stimulant drug khat, which is highly 
addictive, and involve them in the process of running khat (which is technically illegal in 
all of East Africa) back and forth across the borders to Kenya.  
 Though little better than the radical factions that recruit children to fight amongst 
their ranks, pirate gangs are now tapping disgruntled and abandoned youth for use in the 
hijacking of various international ships off the coast of Somalia. Viewing piracy as one of 
the only forms of employment in the area, many young men are attracted by stories of the 
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tempting riches of previous spoils227. Desperate for a way out of poverty, many youth 
seek out pirate gangs in hopes to join their contingents. Older pirates see that they have 
little to lose from employing young and inexperienced men among their ranks. They can 
use the youth to perform tasks that the older pirates do not wish to do, the youngest 
pirates are often short-changed during the share of ransoms after ships have been 
successfully hijacked228, and though they may not have experience in piracy, most have 
already become well acquainted with the use of weapons from the war-torn anarchy that 
they grew up in229.  
 The sad truth is that most youths have already accepted the fatalistic reality that 
they will die soon regardless of their actions; whether they die from civil war and fighting 
on the streets, from endemic poverty with no hope for employment and questionable 
access to future aid, or while spending a few weeks in the water trying to hijack a ship in 
the hopes of gleaning a profit that most Somalis would be unable to make over the course 
of a few years. As described by Somali journalist Ali Osman, “Hijacking a ship is the 
better choice,” when choosing between attempting to survive on the streets, or joining a 
pirate gang. “There is no guarantee in either choice that they would make it alive, but at 
least if they hijack a ship there will be a pay day.230” The expectation of any hopeful 
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future in Somalia rest on the shoulders of these children- the same generations who have 
gone their entire lives without a clue of what government is or how it should function231. 
 
“Aid to Somalia has been part of the problem, not part of the solution.232” 
Humanitarianism As Party to the Conflict 
 Unfortunately as the situation on the ground worsens, children are not the only 
ones drawn to seek employment from non-state actors. Since the TFUG has been unable 
to exert any form of control or stability in Somalia, public officials are abandoning the 
government’s ranks to take on similar jobs from warlords and radical Islamist factions. 
The TFUG military forces have openly complained about lack of food, supplies, and long 
periods of time for which they remain unpaid for their services, despite ample funding for 
the forces provided to the TFUG by the international community233. To make matters 
worse, funding that has been spent on training, and on weaponry given to these troops 
instead proves more beneficial for groups like al-Shabaab, who seek out unpaid 
government officials to join their ranks since they can guarantee a paycheck234. Others 
become freelance gunmen for warlords who promise a share in their plunder, while many 
sell their government-issued equipment on the black market because they do not have 
enough money to survive when salaries go unpaid235. Consequently, a good portion of 
international aid money goes to indirectly training troops for the warlords or al-Shabaab, 
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while men are forced to join the very ranks of those who they were trained to fight 
against, in order to survive236. 
 When viewed through this lens of necessity, it is possible to conclude that more 
often than not humanitarianism becomes a party to the conflict and a source of state 
failure, rather than an avenue for salvation. Foreign-policy mishaps have radicalized the 
population, garnering pools of support for non-state actors and radical Islamist 
factions237. Deep mistrust and insecurity from state-sponsored famine, human rights 
violations and war crimes gone unpunished, and millions who have been forced to flee 
their homes and live in refugee camps that are little more than cesspools of disease 
tarnish the image of the United States and other member states of the United Nations 
beyond the point of repair. Consistent support for corrupt government officials, 
unrecognized as legitimate leaders by the Somali populace, furthers the rift between the 
international community and natives of East Africa. Put bluntly by Somali journalist 
Abdullahi Dool, “The Somali people are agonizing [over] the fact that Somalia is being 
treated as though it belongs to no one.238” 
 Humanitarian engagements have even put their own workers in harms way, since 
the U.N. provides both the salary for NGO workers and the TFUG militia239, whose 
forces defect to join the ranks of the warlords and radicals who have made Somalia the 
most dangerous place in the world for humanitarian workers. The billions of dollars that 
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have been given to various programs within Somalia could have solved the problems on 
the ground a few times over, had anyone cared to stop corrupt officials from lining their 
own pockets with the money. While an in-depth evaluation of the aforementioned and 
similar consequences will be discussed in chapter five, what is important to recognize 
here is that despite twenty years of continued intervention, mistakes have not been 
corrected and situations on the ground have not been pushed to change for the better. It is 
not simply a matter of failing those who are now stuck under the confines of Somalia’s 
state failure. The issue is with the blatant neglect for children, who will be expected to 
carry the weight of these problems and fix their institutions in the future, for which they 
have been given no education or training, and no hope that they will have the power to 
influence change someday for their children. Those born in the past twenty years have no 
idea what it is like to live in a country that has a stable government with institutions that 
provide any form of public goods or services to the people that it is commissioned solely 
to protect. 
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 “LOW RISK, HIGH REWARD OPPORTUNITY. FRESH AIR.  
 SUNSHINE. WORK PART-TIME FROM YOUR BOAT. EARN  
 50 TIMES YOUR EXPECTED LIFETIME INCOME IN ONE  
 DAY. LITTLE EXPERIENCE NEEDED. BE THE ENVY OF YOUR  
    NEIGHBORS240” 
    CHAPTER FOUR 
 
“With the benefits far outweighing the risks, pirates have no incentive to stop the 
pillaging.241” 
The Existence of Piracy Off Somalia’s Coast Is Growing Exponentially 
 The understanding of life within the confines of a failed state, the discussion of 
foreign-policy mistakes and their consequences, and the assumption of state functions by 
non-state actors in a political vacuum has finally brought this case study to its very 
cornerstone- the issue of piracy in Somalia. Pirate activity in Somalia’s territorial waters 
and into the vast stretches of the Gulf of Aden has more than doubled with each passing 
year. Writing only three months into 2010, and already Somali piracy in the Gulf area 
accounts for 42.2% of worldwide attacks this year242. Of those ships taken, pirates are 
allegedly still holding over one hundred crewmembers while they await ransom 
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payments243. With the largest international naval armada in history cruising the Horn of 
Africa in an attempt to intercept hijackings, Somali pirates have become craftier- 
launched attacks in new locations, attempted bolder hijackings closer to the Gulf of 
Aden’s high transit corridor, all the while enjoying the spoils of rising ransoms with 
nearly no legal implications. Confident from their successes, pirates spread their control 
inland, where entire communities survive off of the plunder. It is hard to deny that in the 
past three years in Somalia, it was great to be a pirate.  
 In general, Somali pirates benefit from being located on one of the largest 
coastlines in East Africa, which allows them direct access to the critical transit corridors 
that link the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean, Arabian and Red Seas as well as the Indian 
Ocean through the Gulf of Aden. More than twenty thousand ships a year sail these 
corridors carrying all sorts of goods- chemicals, weapons, and an estimated seven to 
twelve percent of the worlds’ oil supply244. While the government of Somalia managed a 
pittance of funds in what little remains of the state’s economy, in 2008 alone experts 
estimate that Somali pirates gleaned more than eighty million dollars (U.S.) in ransom245. 
Using this money to increase their capabilities, pirates invested in newer technology as 
well as better weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades and surface-to-air missiles246. 
Still using small outboard-powered skiffs, Somali pirates have become savvy enough to 
board supertankers three times the size of average aircraft carriers; one example of this 
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was the successful hijacking of the massive ‘Sirius Star,’ a Saudi Arabian tanker, 
allegedly carrying a cargo of upwards of $100 million in crude oil247. Huge onslaughts of 
newcomers are desperate to involve themselves in any aspect of piracy in Somalia, 
furthering the exponential growth of the industry while the international community and 
shipping industries remain aghast at these operations without any real plans to halt its 
existence. 
 
“The Poor Man’s Farthing Is Worth More Than All the Gold on Africa’s 
Shore…248”  
Is Piracy an Apolitical Act? 
 After living for years in strife under anarchy, trapped in the grasp of corrupt 
officials and failed international policies, pirates have discovered a lucrative avenue for 
survival while causing uproar and major discomfort to the very international governments 
who have made awful decisions on Somalia’s behalf for the past twenty years. Frustrated 
young men with deep-set anger against Somali officials and the international community 
at large feel that they are responding in kind to past actions. They do not view hijacking 
ships as “stealing,” inasmuch as they feel that the collections of ransom payments are a 
mere pittance of what Somalis are truly owed. Harping on double standards, such as the 
American administrations’ allowance of the growing and cultivating of massive opium 
fields in the failed state of Afghanistan, Somalis wracked by poverty feel they should be 
allowed to do what is necessary to make a living249. Hundreds of authors and journalists 
who claim that Somali pirates are solely driven by greed are missing the linchpin of the 
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entire operation- piracy is fueled by the ability to demand international attention from the 
same countries whose blatant indifference only increased desperation in the developing 
world. 
 According to the Geneva Convention, “Piracy is defined as any illegal act of 
violence, detention, or depredation committed for private (rather than political) ends by 
crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft, against another ship, persons or crew.250” 
While it is clear that piracy is a crime, since it involves robbery, coercion and could result 
in harm and/or death for crew members, discovering the intent behind the act (whether it 
was for private or political means) proves much more difficult. In fact, piracy of the past 
(especially around the 18th century in Europe) was almost always seen as a political act 
first, albeit one that had economic incentives for the hijackers251. Moreover, the Somali 
pirates themselves publicly claim that their actions are driven by political reasons- 
whether to gain international attention for the purpose of acquiring aid, to demand that 
sovereignty be returned to the people, or as a response to the previous failures of the 
international community and the double standards often present in the actions that they 
take towards failed states. However, almost all media accounts of Somali piracy point 
directly to its private incentives of financial gain; most do not even mention the current 
living standards, political situation, or the lack thereof. Whether or not one believes that 
the Somali pirates’ actions are politically motivated, and thus technically cannot be 
legally deemed ‘piracy’, one could hardly deny that prior to the influx of hijackings of 
international supertankers, little international attention was paid to Somalia despite 
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worsening living conditions and virtual anarchy. Had the ships preyed on smaller boats, 
or ships whose flag countries were also of little interest, piracy in the Gulf of Aden would 
have remained a non-issue. 
 
“Or, If Protected From On High, Does That Whole Nation Sell and Buy…252” 
How Does Somali Piracy Work? 
 The relative simplicity of piracy combined with the ever-growing incentive of 
spoils, makes piracy a desirable occupation for many in Somalia. On average, it would 
take an employed Somali, working upwards of sixty hours a week, five years or more to 
earn the amount that a low-level pirate can yield from just one attack253. Comparing the 
hypothetical earnings of the average Somali worker and the pirate at the end of only one 
year would be nearly the same as comparing the earnings ratio of the owner of a Fortune 
500 business with one of its minimum wage part-time workers. Since most Somalis are 
unemployed, uneducated, starving and homeless even the most honest, peaceful 
individual could be driven to piracy, as the only means for ending the daily pain of 
constantly teetering on the brink of death. It is surprisingly easy to become a pirate, and 
seemingly just as simple for these groups to hijack vessels in the Gulf of Aden. 
 It requires little funding to send a gang of pirates into the ocean, where they need 
only wait a short time before finding a potential target to hijack. Contingents of about 
nine to twelve pirates occupy small outboard-powered skiffs, stuffed with supplies 
ranging from food to small ammunitions and a ladder, and enough khat to keep the 
pirates occupied during the days where they can do little more than sit around in the hot 
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sun. They usually remain in the water for two to three weeks at a time, navigating by the 
stars or with the use of small GPS devices. Since there is little room for storage on the 
skiffs, pirates bring as much drinking water as possible, have little room to move around, 
and rely on lines and nets to catch small fish, which they eat raw254. 
 While they wait in preparation to board the massive vessels that traverse the area, 
pirates play a virtual game of “leapfrog” until they have acquired a mother ship from 
which they can conduct greater operations. With each boat they repossess, most often 
small fishing boats, they move onto the newer boat to live while the old boat is tied to the 
back255. When they are tired of the new boat, or if they have the ability to acquire one that 
is slightly larger, they release the ship in tow and repeat the process over again, living on 
the new ship with the last boat tied in tow. Even though most pirates still use the small 
skiffs that they originally sailed out on in the actual grand hijacking itself, they serve to 
benefit from the acquisition of better small boats that may be used to patrol the waters 
and alert other pirate gangs of incoming vessels, or of international naval presence in the 
area. Like the street gangs on land in Mogadishu, pirate groups patrol certain swaths of 
territory for which they have laid claim.  
 Increased ransom payments have allowed for some of these gangs to acquire the 
open-access Automatic Identification Systems used by all vessels in the shipping 
industry. If a merchant ship is traveling internationally it is required for the vessel to 
transmit their location through this system. Just as easily as other merchant vessels and 
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naval forces receive these signals, pirates can use them to hunt down their next victim256. 
Wealthier pirate gangs bribe informants in the Kenyan port-city of Mombassa, where 
ships are required to submit paperwork describing all of the information that pirates 
realistically need- the shipping routes the vessel intends to travel, its ultimate destination, 
and most importantly a description of its on-board cargo257. 
 In choosing a vessel to hijack, pirates often give priority to boats from shipping 
companies or flag-states from which previous ransoms were received. Pirates either shoot 
flares very close to the ship so that it will stop and allow them to board, or they board 
secretly with the use of small rope or aluminum ladders. After going through the on-
board cargo to determine the amount of ransom that they will ask for, they demand the 
ship’s captain to call the owner and break the news that the boat has been hijacked and 
will remain under the pirates’ control until the ransom has been paid258. Then, the ship is 
usually brought back into the territorial waters of Somalia, where it can remain close 
enough to land so that pirates may travel back and forth to their lairs for food and 
supplies funded either through the “pirate stock exchange259” or from funds that the 
gangs have saved from previous ransoms. In the meantime, there is little to do other than 
sit and wait for the ransom to be paid. 
 While upwards of 800 passengers of hijacked ships were held for ransom in 2009, 
statistics from the past five years show that Somali pirates rarely harm their captives. If 
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anything, keeping passengers alive and in good health proves more beneficial, since each 
passenger can be worth a few hundreds thousand dollars a piece in ransom. Also, their 
reputation for civility towards the hostages makes it difficult for governments and 
shipping companies to initiate strikes on pirates’ skiffs or mother ships260. Known pirate 
Asad ‘Booyah’ Abdulahi told interviewers that the pirates often befriend their hostages, 
taking great care to forge trust between captors and their captives. They ensure hostages 
are well fed and in good health, all the while knowing that they will remain unharmed, 
and will be freed as soon as ransom has been collected261. During the four-month period 
that the M/V Faina was detained by pirates while awaiting ransom payment, the pirates 
even allowed the USS Vella Gulf (a U.S. naval warship) to perform multiple health 
inspections, from a close distance. The hostages would all line up on the top deck of the 
ship, while the naval contingent three hundred yards away would count the number of 
crewmen and attempt to make determinations of how they were being treated and fed262. 
 Most of these groups operate off the shores of Somalia in the fishing communities 
of the northern Puntland region; the most prominent groups operate in the Eyl district, 
while smaller groups have known contingents in Bossaso, Qandala, Caluula, Bargaal and 
Garacad263. The region is perfect for pirate lairs- vast stretches of coastline that go un-
patrolled, since Somalia lacks any functioning law enforcement, and where resentment 
from living in abject poverty and/or the hate driven from past actions made by the 
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international community easily drives men to want to attack the successful vessels owned 
by countries that they detest. Along with the pirates, other rogue groups use the area for 
human trafficking and arms smuggling business ventures264. Though the region is 
manned by a semi-autonomous government supported by locals, its small and ill-funded 
police contingent are vastly ill equipped to even attempt to tackle the powerful gangs on 
the shore. To illustrate this point, the revenue that pirates collected from ransom in 2008 
was nearly double the entire budget of the Puntland government in that same year265. 
 
“He Who Replies To Words of Doubt Doth Put the Light of Knowledge Out…266” 
To Stop Illegal Fishing and Toxic Dumping In Their Waters, Somalis Need the Pirates
 Giving themselves the title of “coast guards”, pirate cells usually consist of a 
variety of men ranging from eager teenagers with little experience to seasoned ex-
gunmen who were previously the freelance strong-arm of local warlords. Many are 
former fisherman that have been greatly affected by illegal fishing in the area, to the 
extent where they could no longer make a living off of their daily catches267. Since the 
Somali government refuses to take action against the seven hundred reported vessels 
illegally fishing in its territorial waters268, Somalis feel little incentive to halt their 
pirating activities. Moreover, the influx of pirate attacks in the area have done more to 
suspend illegal fishing from its waters than any other undertaking by the Puntland 
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regime, the TFUG or the international community. When the Puntland regime attempted 
to implement initiatives against foreign fishing companies, the companies fought back. 
They challenged the punishments on the basis that the Puntland regime, though it may 
have been the only functioning authority within Somalia, could not claim to be the 
sovereign state, and thus could not legally implement its jurisdiction or impose a 
punishment269. Since no legitimate state really existed in Somalia, there was no single 
group that could determine legality of fishing zones, so foreign fishing companies could 
deplete the local stock of fish at their own will. 
 Despite knowing that the vast majority of Somalis attempted to make a living by 
fishing its shores, foreign trawlers with much more advanced resources overtook the area, 
making it impossible for natives to compete. Countless documents detail the foreign 
companies that abused Somalia’s statelessness in this manner, including boats from 
“Italy, France, Spain, Greece, Russia, Britain, Ukraine, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, 
India, Yemen and Egypt.270” A report from the Kenyan news outlet Democracy Now 
claimed that the companies stole “more than $300 million worth of tuna, shrimp, lobster 
and other sea-life.271” The validity of this account, as well as that of other reports 
detailing foreign ships that had dumped nuclear waste materials in the territorial waters, 
were recently confirmed by Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the U.N. envoy to Somalia. 
Despite backing up the probability of these on-going allegations, and confirming that the 
pleas for help from the Puntland authorities on behalf of the Somali people were justified, 
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the United Nations and the international community collectively decided not to take 
action. In fact, many did not even respond272. It is no wonder, then, that many pirates 
publicly exculpate their actions, denying allegations of hijacking for profit, and 
proclaiming that their actions have been necessary in order to stop foreign trawlers from 
illegally fishing and dumping toxic waste in the waters that they rely on for survival. 
 Many Somalis are grateful to the pirates for fighting against the foreigners and 
their boating companies, since years of illegal activity on their behalf caused massive 
economic decline and virtually total unemployment in the fishing industry, a market that 
once employed the majority of working Somalis. One Somali refugee explained the 
reasoning to a reporter: “If one considers the ransoms pirates are given to the amount of 
fish stolen from [Somalia’s] waters, [the money constitutes] but a drop in the ocean.273” 
Natives believe that the foreign trawlers are manned by bandits who themselves are 
pirates. According to Noel Choogn, the director of the International Maritime Bureau’s 
piracy reporting center in Malaysia, some Somalis employed on fishing boats have had to 
pretend to be pirates just to ward off the foreign ships from casting their nets274! When 
the international community openly declared that the actions of the foreign trawlers 
should go unpunished, Somalis were devastated by the blatant double standard of the 
U.N.’s reply to local piracy. Numerous resolutions recently passed by the U.N. Security 
Council resulted in the deployment of a large international naval armada that patrols 
Somali territorial waters on a daily basis. The Security Council’s resolutions were truly 
revolutionary, as allowing international ships to take actions (including force) within 
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Somalia’s territorial waters goes against international maritime legal code, inasmuch as it 
also openly encroaches on Somali’s sovereignty on the coast. 
 
“The Lamb Misus’d Breeds Public Strife, And Yet Forgives the Butcher’s 
Knife…275” 
Pirates As Stock Brokers, Robin Hood-Style Community Saviors and the Most Eligible 
Bachelors in Somalia 
 On land and at sea, Somali pirates are reshaping their communities in ways that 
the transitional governments and humanitarian interventionists were never able to do. The 
influx of million dollar ransoms into struggling local economies has turned small 
coastline fishing villages into mini cosmopolitan commercial centers where black market 
dealers now have access to expensive goods, and even the illegal sales of much needed 
vaccines276. Since pirates often give widely to their community, most natives see them as 
modern-day Robin Hoods, and this positive reinforcement provides pirates and their safe-
havens great protection from outsiders. Illuminating this view, one local Eyl resident Eli 
Mohamud told foreign reporters, “I know your are here looking for our heroes… I don’t 
call them pirates- they are our marines. They are protecting our resources from those 
looting them… they are not criminals.277” Just as Mr. Mohamud described the pirates as 
“marines”, many pirates reiterate this symbol calling themselves “coast guards” or a 
version of a local police force in the absence of a government body that can police the 
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area against the well-documented cases of illegal fishing and even the massive dumping 
of toxic waste into Somali waters. 
 Whether or not locals agree with the physical act of hijacking the boats, the 
business ventures that spawn from the spoils of piracy makes it the only activity 
financially sound enough to rebuild hollow infrastructure in coastal villages and towns. 
The Haradheere town deputy-security officer, Mohamed Adam, reported that since the 
area received a direct percentage of every ransom from ships that were taken, the money 
was enough to rebuild a hospital and a few public schools278. While this does not sound 
particularly significant, one must look at the current situation through the perspective of 
an average Somali. Violence literally breaks out on the street on a daily basis, where 
weaponry that is typically used in military combat is wielded by children who open-fire 
on marketplaces without even flinching. Hospitals do not exist in most areas; people can 
either attempt homemade remedies for the injured, or let them die. The creation of a 
hospital, regardless of its size, is a much better option than sitting at home and waiting to 
die. Pirates give their communities great reason to appreciate their presence.  
 By engaging the community indirectly in the act of piracy, huge networks now 
exist of financiers on land who provide whatever materials they can (supplies, money, 
weapons, etc.) in hopes for a percentage of ransom returns. This spirit motivated the 
creation of the ‘pirate stock exchange’, where pirates often appear to schmooze support 
from the local communities that harbor them. In just a years time, the ‘stock exchange’ 
has experienced massive growth, now hosting what the exchange calls seventy-two 
“maritime companies”, with a few that have already successfully hijacked and received 
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ransoms for their ships279. The exchange itself is open twenty-four hours a day, where 
long lines form outside of the small shack, ranging from wealthy investors to the wives 
and mothers of pirates currently at sea who gather hoping for news from their loved 
ones.280 Pirate cells have established clear policies and guidelines for the distribution of 
ransoms, where financiers (either private or through the stock exchange) receive, on 
average, thirty percent of the profits. The remaining seventy percent is allegedly split 
whereby the pirates get fifty percent of the spoils, which they divide amongst themselves, 
and according to one pirate Jaqraffi, “the remaining 20 per cent is given to the poor and 
all those who, in one way or another, help the pirates on shore and this includes local 
government officials who expect bribes from every successful venture.281” In this way, 
piracy flourishes along the shore of Puntland while officials in the area turn a blind eye to 
the entire venture. 
 Still, not all locals support piracy. Some are worried about potential future 
conflict with the international community, whose eclectic navies already patrol the 
Somali shores daily. Many feel it is only a matter of time before the international 
community allows some country’s military to engage with force against the pirate lairs on 
land. Also, regardless of pirates’ financial contributions to their localities, their very 
existence slows (or halts altogether) the humanitarian aid attempting to reach Somali 
shores. The majority of food supplies, especially that which is brought in by the World 
Food Program (the greatest supplier of aid to Somalia), arrive by sea. With the additional 
costs inherent in providing protection to aid-carrying ships, which now only travel to the 
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area with a naval warship in tow, less money may be allocated for relief supplies. There 
are already a great number of Somalis who go hungry despite the introduction of food aid 
in the country, reducing its presence can only prove harmful to those who need it most. 
 
“He Who Shall Hurt the Little Wren Shall Never Be Belov’d By Men…282” 
Who Should Be Concerned About Piracy? 
 It is undeniable that the influx of piracy has hurt the shipping industry the most, 
driving costs of insurance and general shipping operations up nearly $500 million a year 
for the past three years. This price hike represents a massive escalation in the cost to 
insure tankers and voyages, as well as the exaggerated ransom costs which insurance 
companies do not cover. In 2009, the average insurance rate for a tanker’s single trip 
through the Gulf of Aden increased from $500 to a whopping $20,000283! Shipping 
companies have found it harder to maintain crews willing to sail through the region, often 
having to pay double the average salary to sailors that agree to traverse the area284. Some 
shipping companies instead choose to extend the voyages themselves, and ships have to 
sail an extra week or two in order to avoid the region, by re-routing around the Cape of 
Good Hope. The extension of voyages also serves to greatly increase overall costs, as 
with each additional day of travel companies must provide higher payments to sailors, 
increased insurance coverage, and extra supplies for those on board. Circumnavigating 
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through Southern Africa may add up to sixteen days to the ship’s voyage, which costs a 
shipping company, on average, an additional $80,000285. 
 In the same manner, many companies feel mired by the increased need to pay out 
ransoms in order to re-obtain their expensive cargoes. While the payment not only 
represents a great cost in and of itself, sometimes a few million dollars for each ship, the 
act of paying ransoms serves only to increase the piracy conglomeration in the area. 
Successful payments drive newcomers to piracy, in the form of investors, pirates and 
other actors, while the amount requested for future ransom payments may also increase 
due to the rising amounts of ransoms that have already been paid. Thus each time 
companies acquiesce ransom requests, they inevitably harm themselves at the same time. 
To retrieve their crew and cargo, they must airdrop the ransom payment, while the 
payment itself represents an increased probability that the company will have more ships 
hijacked in the future. Insurance companies refuse to add specific coverage for ransoms 
and will not cover piracy as a “named risk,” fearing that in doing so pirates will request 
higher ransoms286. Thus, shipping companies must allocate their own means to pay out 
the millions of dollars demanded for each ship. In the past five years alone, the average 
ransom payment has increased 6,000%287, which, if this trend continues, can single-
handedly bankrupt shipping companies already hurting from the current global recession. 
 With the international community doing little to prevent piracy or prosecute the 
hijackers, and the virtual anarchy in Somalia that is unable to address the conflict, pirates 
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have no incentive to halt their enterprise. Since by international agreement, merchant 
vessels are not allowed to carry arms, pirates have little worry that they will be harmed 
while at sea. This explains the exponential increases in hijacking attempts with each 
passing year. Since the benefits of piracy remain much greater than any risk involved in 
the hijackings, the situation will inevitably worsen in the future. While regional 
authorities and the international community feel they still benefit from their indifference, 
there are many consequences of piracy for which they should be alarmed.  
 Despite the fact that crew often remain unharmed during the hijackings, and that 
cargo is often returned in full once ransoms are paid, the international community still 
has reason for concern. The corridors of the Gulf of Aden are an area that massive 
chemical tankers often traverse288, and these ships are easy targets because of their size, 
which also limits them to travel at relatively slow-speeds. Regardless of intent, if the 
chemicals were to leak into the waters, or are sold on the black market, the end result 
could be extremely hazardous. Regional authorities also have reason to be wary of piracy, 
since international access to the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal has been a major 
source of their respective countries’ revenues. Even the Suez Canal Authority is 
reportedly weary, since its revenue is already in decline as ships take longer routes 
avoiding the Horn of Africa altogether289. While there remains great disparity between 
individual governments and private shipping countries over which party should shoulder 
the brunt of action necessary when ships are under pirate attack, neither group will agree 
to work together in attempting to halt piracy on the sea or land. Both groups seem to have 
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ample suggestions for what the other should be doing to stop piracy, but neither wants to 
assume the responsibility or go into it alone. 
 This discrepancy between individual governments and shipping companies points 
to the greater issues involved in ending piracy in Somalia- the recognition that aid is a 
business290, and successful businesses must be tended to both by those who manage it and 
those who rely on its services. When the management fails to address the needs of its 
customers, the business begins to falter until it is eventually bankrupted. Financing 
programs that will better the institution will prove to be little more than a band-aid given 
to a flesh wound- in order to truly change the status quo individuals must have the will 
necessary to roll up their sleeves and truly work until they see the results of a better 
tomorrow. If not, the enterprise can do little more than implode. 
 
“What happens if a state fails and nobody notices?291” 
Suggestions For the Future 
 Regardless of whether or not the international community decides to intervene on 
the ground, it still must learn from its past mistakes and foreign policy blunders. Most 
importantly, it must understand that actual effort is required to make change- throwing 
money at the situation will never buy effective governance. It cannot just accept the fact 
that ninety-five percent of aid never reaches its intended recipients- writing a check to a 
country in crisis is entirely different from providing actual help. Since the U.S. and 
international community frequently choose partners that only end up causing harm, great 
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care must be taken to ensure those acting in the name of the international community are 
accountable for their actions. If this were done more often, less money would be errantly 
wasted, and perhaps foreign actors would not be seen as the enemy- an ideology that 
fuels non-state actors and radical Islamists. The United States especially needs to 
consider its actions, and missteps, towards collapsed states. Spending $600,000 on a 
missile used to kill one alleged terrorist in Somalia292 while three and a half million 
people are classified as living in a humanitarian emergency does very little for one’s 
public image. 
 Furthermore, aid money cannot be sent as an end unto itself, it needs to be given 
with clear goals dictated from start to finish in humanitarian operations- from who it will 
go to, what they will be doing with it and, finally, those entrusted with the funds must be 
held accountable if the aid money does not go where it has been intended to. A good start 
may be to provide food to the near four million people who, without access to 
humanitarian aid, will die this year from forced famine. Aid needs to be given 
consistently, and reconstruction projects need to be seen through and completed. It should 
be unacceptable that still, when asked if the United States would be part of a coalition to 
establish peace in Somalia, U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Zalmay Khalilzad replied “well, 
you know that we are quite busy as you know, number one. Number two, that there are 
always issues with the U.S. leading a coalition.293” If the international community is 
being truthful in its claim that it wishes to end the problem of piracy, problems on land 
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must be addressed. So long as there remains great incentive without punishment, piracy 
will continue to grow and flourish. 
 
“But the United Nations lacks the means to carry out its resolutions, and its member 
states lack the will to do so.294” 
All Caused By the Lack of Political Will?  
 While shipping companies forked over millions of dollars to pirates, who may 
have shared a small percentage with their local communities, it is a sad reality that only 
half of the amount of ransom paid out last year would have been more than enough to 
rebuild many infrastructural elements of the state. Since many become pirates when they 
feel there is no other option for employment, the money could have gone to job creation 
or education. Without the implementation of these positive institutions that will forge 
reconstruction in the area, it will be difficult for upcoming generations to break out of the 
cyclical consequences living for years under state failure.  
 Furthermore, the creation of a government-run security apparatus, that included a 
non-corrupt police force and judicial system, would allow Somalis to regain trust in the 
government that, in time, would create legitimacy. It is not enough for the security 
apparatus to extend itself to the deleterious elements in society; it must also punish 
international actors who have abused the lawlessness to act as it pleased without 
repercussion. The government must be cleared of former warlords and other actors who 
have a history of human rights abuses and war crimes. Similarly, clarity and openness in 
public spending is a necessity for rebuilding the state- from declaring its funds to 
publishing how and where they were spent. Moreover, civil servants and the armed forces 
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must be paid a steady salary to ensure that they will not defect and aid non-state actors 
who thrive when the state has collapsed.  
 It is not enough to rebuild the bombed out buildings that line the streets. The 
entire “national psyche” must be rebuilt295- remembering that there are entire generations 
who have lived without ever having experienced government and its institutions. 
Furthermore, the international community should not be so weary about the bottom-up 
political movements that occur in Somalia, such as the ICU in 2006. Put in perspective, 
despite only holding real power for six months before they were forced into exile, the 
ICU successfully won over the support of the people while effectively creating peace. It 
was also the only time in the twenty years of anarchy that piracy ceased nearly 
altogether296. Without local collaboration in the creation of government institutions, it 
will prove very difficult for transitional governments that have been established by the 
international community to be seen as the legitimate government in the eyes of natives. 
 Lastly, the Somali experience has proven that preventing further collapse in 
failing states relies on a commodity that few are willing to extend- political will. 
Members of the international community are well aware that alleviating the pains caused 
by years of anarchy will be expensive and will take a substantially long time to heal. 
They must also understand the weight of their actions in these countries- throwing 
support behind TFG and TFUG governments despite its lack of responsibility, security 
and control, only served to make members of the international community seem 
untrustworthy partners.  
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“It might be by negative example, but Somalia has become one big laboratory 
experiment in the anatomy of state failure.297” 
The Ultimate Loophole 
 Regardless of states’ abilities to use its naval power to halt piracy on the seas, the 
U.N. Security Council’s resolutions do not offer an avenue through which offenders may 
be prosecuted. It is unclear under international law how jurisdiction would be determined 
if the international community even tried to put the pirates on trial. Since Somalia does 
not have a working judicial system or prisons, pirates would have to be extradited for 
punishment in foreign lands. Moreover, it would be unlikely for alleged pirates to receive 
a fair trial, as evidence would prove difficult to collect and witnesses would have to travel 
in order to provide testimony. Since the very states whose naval forces are part of the 
international contingent charged with patrolling Somalia’s territorial waters are unsure of 
what to do once pirates are captured, they are often forced to simply return the men to 
shore, after confiscating their arms. Once the international naval force sails away into the 
distance, there is little stopping the pirate from re-boarding a skiff and sailing back into 
the Gulf of Aden, awaiting its next victim for hijacking. 
 Whether or not they are aware of this, the Somali pirates have managed to wedge 
themselves in a very interesting legal loophole. Piracy, by its legal definition given by the 
Geneva Convention, cannot be politically motivated. So long as pirates continue to 
palliate their actions as that of ‘coast guards’ or the ‘protectorate of the Somali coastline’ 
from the likes of illegal fishing companies and toxic waste dumpers, they abdicate the 
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international community’s charge that the pirates are motivated by greed and greed alone. 
If pirates are put on trial, they may also be able to further exploit their actions through a 
political tinge. The people of Somalia have lived without a functioning government for 
twenty years. Though the international community praises the transitional governments 
as legitimate, it is clear that they hold no control at state-level. There is hard evidence of 
illegal fishing and toxic dumping, amidst further evidence of a whole host of war crimes 
and human rights violations. The very pirates whose enterprise flourishes because of the 
vacuum left in the wake of state failure may be able to justify their actions as performing 
“a necessary public function in the absence of effective government.298” 
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